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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three empirical essays in development and behavioral economics.
Chapter 1 considers the impact of heavy alcohol consumption on savings behavior among
low-income males in India. High levels of alcohol consumption are more common among
the poor. This fact could have economic consequences beyond mere income effects because
alcohol impairs mental processes and decision-making. Since alcohol is thought to induce
myopia, this paper tests for impacts on self-control and on savings behavior. In a three-week
field experiment with low-income workers in India, I provided 229 individuals with a
high-return savings opportunity and randomized incentives for sobriety. The incentives
significantly reduced daytime drinking as measured by decreased breathalyzer scores. This
in turn increased savings by approximately 60 percent. No more than half of this effect is
explained by changes in income net of alcohol expenditures. In addition, consistent with
enhanced self-control due to lower inebriation levels, incentivizing sobriety reduced the
impact of a savings commitment device. Finally, alcohol consumption itself is prone to
self-control problems: over half of the study participants were willing to sacrifice money to
receive incentives to be sober, exhibiting demand for commitment to increase their sobriety.
These findings suggest that heavy alcohol consumption is not just a result of self-control
problems, but also creates self-control problems in other areas, potentially even exacerbating
poverty by reducing savings.
Chapter 2 (with Esther Duflo, Michael Kremer, and Jon Robinson) investigates agricul-
tural technology adoption in Sub-Saharan Africa. Insufficient knowledge of appropriate
use can hamper technology adoption. In the agricultural context, if farmers do not observe
iii
each others’ inputs, diffusion of both information on the optimal input mix and of the
technology itself may be slow. In the context we examine, conditional on using fertilizer,
farmers tend to systematically overuse fertilizer (per treated area) on the intensive margin,
hence, making it on average unprofitable and possibly curbing usage at the extensive margin.
This paper reports results from a large-scale field experiment, which introduced a simple
and salient tool, a blue measuring spoon, to help farmers remember how much fertilizer
to use. A randomly selected subset of farmers received the technology for free, and the
remaining farmers can purchase it at fertilizer stores at a nominal price. Farmers who were
randomly assigned to receive a measuring spoon subsequently improved knowledge of
how much fertilizer to use, and were more likely to use fertilizer. Spoon purchases among
the remaining farmers were higher when these were more likely to use fertilizer due to a
randomly assigned fertilizer discount program, and when communication about agriculture
was encouraged. Unlike fertilizer adoption itself, purchase and use of measuring spoons
diffused rapidly through social networks.
Chapter 3 (with Tom Zimmermann) provides new empirical evidence on trading behavior
among individual investors. The main contribution of this essay is to contrast competing
explanations of the disposition effect, investors’ tendency to hold losing investments too
long and to sell winning investments too soon, based on their predictions for realizing
different sizes of gains and losses. We find that for all holding periods longer than one
month and for both gains and losses, the probability to sell a stock declines monotonically
with the size of the absolute return. This fact is not consistent with the model of realization
utility, but it is consistent with a version of prospect theory as outlined below. Moreover,
we find that investors’ propensity to make any trade is largest for small absolute portfolio
returns, a fact that is difficult to explain by the existing theories.
iv
Contents
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
1 Alcohol and Self-Control: A Field Experiment in India 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Alcohol in Chennai, India, and Developing Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.1 Alcohol Consumption in Chennai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.2 Alcohol Consumption in India and in Developing Countries . . . . . 8
1.3 Experimental Design and Balance Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.1 Overview of Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.2 Recruitment and Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.3 Timeline and Treatment Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.4 Lottery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3.5 Outcomes of Interest and Savings Treatments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3.6 Sample Characteristics and Randomization Checks . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.4 Does Alcohol Affect Saving? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.4.1 The Impact of Incentives on Alcohol Consumption (First Stage) . . . . 26
1.4.2 Did Increased Sobriety Change Savings Behavior? . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.4.3 Robustness and Potential Confounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.4.4 The Effect of Changes in Income Net of Alcohol Expenditures . . . . 39
1.4.5 Accounting for Mechanical Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.4.6 Household Resources and Complementary Consumption . . . . . . . 44
1.5 Are Sobriety and Commitment Savings Substitutes? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.5.1 A Simple Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.5.2 Empirical Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
1.6 Do Individuals Want to Reduce Their Drinking? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2 Technology Diffusion and Appropriate Use: Evidence from Western Kenya 63
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.2 Experimental Design and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
v
2.2.1 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.2.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.2.3 Summary Statistics, Randomization, and Attrition . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.3 Fertilizer Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.3.1 Fertilizer Coupon Redemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.3.2 Self-reported Fertilizer Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.4 Bluespoon and Knowledge Diffusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.4.1 Group Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.4.2 Bluespoon Diffusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.4.3 Knowledge Diffusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3 Trading Decisions as a Function of Stock Return Quantiles: Implications for the
Disposition Effect 88
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.2 Theoretical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.2.1 Realization Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.2.2 Prospect Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.3 Data and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.3.2 Duration Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.3.3 Proportion of Realized Gains and Losses: The Odean Approach . . . 100
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.4.1 A First Look at the Data using Histograms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.4.2 Duration Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.4.3 Odean Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.4.4 The Propensity to Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.5 Relation to Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4 References 126
Bibliography 127
5 Appendix 136
5.1 Supplementary Figure and Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.2 More Detailed Model Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.2.1 Solution for the Case of Isoelastic Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.2.2 A Special Case: Log Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
vi
List of Tables
1.1 Eligibility Status at Different Recruitment Stages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.2 Choices between Incentives for Sobriety and Unconditional Payments . . . . 17
1.3 Summary of Estimated Effect of Incentives on Alcohol Consumption . . . . . 27
1.4 The Effect of Incentives on Sobriety Before and During Study Office Visits . 34
1.5 The Effect of Incentives on Overall Alcohol Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.6 The Effect of Incentives on Attendance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.7 The Effect of Sobriety Incentives on Savings at the Study Office . . . . . . . . 38
1.8 The Marginal Propensity to Save out of Lottery Earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.9 The Effect of Sobriety Incentives on Labor Market Outcomes . . . . . . . . . 43
1.10 Decomposing the Impact of Incentives on Savings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.11 Interaction between Sobriety Incentives and Savings Treatments . . . . . . . . 53
1.12 Demand for Incentives over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
1.13 Demand for Incentives Across Treatment Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.1 Summary Statistics and Randomization Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.2 Attrition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.3 Fertilizer Coupon Redemption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.4 Fertilizer Coupon Redemption: Effect of Bluespoons and Text Message Re-
minders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.5 Self-reported Fertilizer Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.6 Group Membership (Among Original Respondents) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.7 Knowledge Diffusion Among Original Respondents (School Survey) . . . . . 83
2.8 Bluespoon Diffusion (Among Original Respondents) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.9 Bluespoon Diffusion (Agricultural Contacts) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2.10 Knowledge Diffusion among Original Respondents and Agricultural Contacts
(Long Endline Survey) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.1 Demographic characteristics of investors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.2 Cox-proportional hazard model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.3 PGR and PLR fo the entire data set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.4 Propensity to trade as a function of portfolio return . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
vii
3.5 Unconditional probability to sell for different holding days . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.6 Probability of selling as a function of stock returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.1 Balance Table for Main Demographs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.2 Balance Table for Work and Savings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.3 Balance Table for Alcohol Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
5.4 Effect of Sobriety Incentives on Family Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
5.5 Expenses on Food, Coffee & Tea, and Tobacco & Paan . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.6 Attrition and Inconsistencies of Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.7 Summary of Choices in Choice Group Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
viii
List of Figures
1.1 Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2 Cross-sectional Relationship between Daily Amounts Saved and BAC . . . . 25
1.3 Sobriety and Attendance by Alcohol Incentive Treatment Group . . . . . . . 28
1.4 Cumulative Savings by Day in Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.5 Effect of Commitment Savings as Function of β . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1.6 Interaction between Sobriety Incentives and Savings Treatments . . . . . . . . 52
1.7 Sobriety Incentives vs. Commitment Savings: Deposits and Withdrawals . . 54
1.8 Choices Across Treatment Groups and Over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.1 Realization utility prediction for individual trading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.2 Implied trading pattern in the realization utility model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.3 Stock price for six periods and resulting exit behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.4 Implied trading pattern in the casino gambling model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.5 Local risk aversion in the value function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.6 Implied trading pattern in the bunching model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.7 Histogram of stock holding durations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.8 Bias towards realized returns in the Odean approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.9 Histograms of returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.10 Kernel density estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.11 Conditional hazard rate for gains and losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.12 Conditional hazard rate for gains and losses by return tercile . . . . . . . . . 107
3.13 Conditional hazard rate as function of return . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.14 Proportions of realized gains and losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.15 Nonparametric estimate of propensity to trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.16 Replication of Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
3.17 Pooled selling schedules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.1 Prevalence of Alcohol Consumption among Low-Income Males in Chennai . 138
5.2 Prevalence of Alcohol Consumption among Low-Income Males in Chennai . 139
5.3 Fraction of Weekly Income Spent on Alcohol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
5.4 Fraction with Positive Breathalyzer Score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
ix
5.5 Reported Sum of Total Savings by Incentive Treatment Group at Baseline . . 142
5.6 Interaction between Sobriety Incentives (not pooled) and Savings Treatments 143
x
Acknowledgments
I would like first to thank my fantastic team of advisors, who provided encouragement and
guidance throughout my time at Harvard. I am deeply grateful to my primary advisor,
Sendhil Mullainathan, for his tireless support, motivation, and patience. I could not have
asked for a better mentor. Esther Duflo’s course sparked my interest in microeconomic
development questions. Esther’s rigorous approach to research, her drive, and thought-
fulness make her a unique role model that I aspire to be like. Michael Kremer’s relentless
pursuit of both knowledge and real-world impact through research is truly inspiring. His
advice has made me a better researcher. David Laibson has improved my understanding of
economic theory. I have enormously benefited from his suggestions and guidance. I thank
my friends and classmates for support, instruction, laughter, and commiseration. Especially
Benjamin Schoefer has weathered many days and nights in the Littauer basement with me.
I also thank Kate Sturla, Luke Ravenscroft, Manasa Reddy, Andrew Locke, Nick Swanson,
Louise Paul-Delvaux, and all of the research staff in Chennai for their outstanding field
assistance. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their unconditional love and support.
My parents and siblings shaped the person I am now. I have always felt their presence
throughout my life, despite the geographical distance.
xi
To my family.
xii
Chapter 1
Alcohol and Self-Control: A Field
Experiment in India
1.1 Introduction
Heavy alcohol consumption is correlated with poverty, yet the nature and consequences
of this relationship are not well understood.1 Poverty could cause demand for alcohol by
enhancing its short-term benefits.2 But alcohol may also be a cause of poverty. In particular,
alcohol is thought to affect myopia and self-control. If these effects are large, then heavy
alcohol consumption could interfere with a variety of forward-looking decisions. By affecting
savings decisions, insurance take-up, human capital investments, and earnings, alcohol
could reduce wealth accumulation and deepen poverty. However, though theoretically
possible, we do not know whether such effects are present or economically meaningful in
practice.
1In many countries, low-income individuals are in fact more likely to be abstinent from alcohol altogether.
At the same time, in many countries including in India, heavy drinking is more common among the poor. This
is described in more detail in the next section.
2Alcohol is known to be a powerful anesthetic (Woodrow and Eltherington (1988)), it helps individuals fall
asleep (Ebrahim et al. (2013)), and it can make individuals feel better about themselves (“drunken self inflation,"
Banaji and Steele (1989)), or relieve stress and anxiety (“drunken relief," Steele and Josephs (1988)). At the same
time, physical pain, poor sleep, low self-esteem, and stress are all correlated with poverty (Poleshuk and Green
(2008), Patel et al. (2010), Haushofer and Fehr (2014), Patel (2007)).
1
This paper empirically tests for one such effect: the impact of alcohol on savings behavior.
To examine this relationship, I conducted a three-week field experiment with 229 cycle-
rickshaw peddlers in Chennai, India, in which all subjects were provided with a high-return
savings opportunity. To create exogenous variation in alcohol consumption, a randomly
selected subset of study participants were offered financial incentives for sobriety. For a
cross-randomized subset of study participants, the savings account was a commitment
savings account, i.e. individuals could not withdraw their savings until the end of their
participation in the study. This feature allowed me to consider the impact of increasing
sobriety on self-control problems in savings behavior. In addition, I elicited willingness to
pay for incentives for sobriety to assess the extent to which self-control problems themselves
contribute to the demand for alcohol.
The incentives for sobriety significantly increased study participants’ sobriety during
their daily savings decisions, providing a “first stage" to estimate the impact of sobriety
on savings behavior. Individuals who were given incentives for sobriety decreased their
daytime drinking as measured by a 33 percent increase in the fraction of individuals who
visited the study office sober. The intervention also reduced overall alcohol consumption
and expenditures by 5 to 10 percent.
Offering incentives for sobriety increased individuals’ daily savings at the study office
by 60 percent compared to a control group that received similar average study payments
independent of their alcohol consumption. This increase in savings is a combination of
changes in income net of alcohol expenditures, and changes in savings behavior for given
resources. Assessing the contribution of the former requires an estimate of the marginal
propensity to save out of available income. Using an estimate of the marginal propensity
to save obtained by separately randomizing study payments via a lottery and observing
the impact on savings, I find that the combined effects of increased earnings outside of the
study and decreased alcohol expenditures explain about half of the observed increase in
savings. The remaining share of the increase in savings appears to be due to the effect of
alcohol on time preferences. Consistent with this, the estimated marginal propensity to
2
save is almost twice as large for individuals who were offered incentives for sobriety as for
individuals in the control group, though this difference is not statistically significant.
The relationship between the effects of sobriety incentives and commitment savings
provides further evidence that increasing sobriety directly affects time preferences. In par-
ticular, I find that sobriety incentives and the commitment savings feature were substitutes
in terms of their effect on savings. While commitment savings and sobriety incentives
each individually increased subjects’ savings, there was no additional effect of the savings
commitment feature on savings by individuals who were offered sobriety incentives, and
vice versa. These patterns are consistent with alcohol increasing present bias. An alternative
interpretation is that the incentives mitigated the need for commitment savings by reducing
the consumption of alcohol, a key temptation good for this population. However, the
intervention mainly reduced drinking or shifted it to later times of the day rather than
causing abstinence from alcohol altogether. This makes a direct effect of alcohol on time
preferences the more likely explanation.
Over 50 percent of subjects exhibited demand for commitment to increase their sobriety,
indicating a greater awareness of and willingness to overcome self-control problems than
found in other settings, for instance for smoking (Gine et al. (2010)), or exercising (Royer
et al. (2014)). Specifically, in three sets of weekly decisions that each elicited preferences
for sobriety incentives in the subsequent week, over half of the study participants chose
options that implied weakly dominated study payments. In addition, more than a third
preferred incentives for sobriety over unconditional payments, even when the latter were
strictly higher than the maximum amount subjects could earn with the incentives. These
individuals were willing to sacrifice study payments of about ten percent of daily income
even in the best case scenario of visiting the study office sober every day. This finding
provides clear evidence for a desire for sobriety by making future drinking more costly, in
contrast to the predictions of the Becker and Murphy (1988) rational addiction model.3
3Becker and Murphy (1988) showed that many behaviors of addicted individuals are, at least in theory,
consistent with optimization based on stable preferences. Gruber and Ko˝szegi (2001) subsequently challenged
the implicit assumption of time-consistent preferences and replaced it with hyperbolic discounting as formalized
3
The high demand for commitment does not appear to be the result of misunderstandings
on the part of the subjects. Willingness to pay for sobriety incentives did not decrease over
time among individuals who were asked to choose repeatedly. In fact, past exposure
to the incentives increased individuals’ demand for the incentives. Individuals who had
been randomly selected to receive incentives for sobriety for 15 days were more likely
to choose incentives for a subsequent week compared to individuals who had received
payments independent of their sobriety. Further, individuals whose sobriety increased in
response to the incentives were particularly likely to choose the incentives subsequently.
Moreover, individuals with lower concurrent inebriation levels were more likely to choose
the incentives. Finally, reassuringly, the demand for the incentives decreased in the cost of
incentives.
The finding that alcohol causes self-control problems builds on psychology research
on “alcohol myopia" (Steele and Josephs (1990)). This line of research sought to reconcile
the seemingly contradictory effects of alcohol found in a large body of previous research.
Depending on circumstances, alcohol can relieve or increase anxiety and tension. It can
inflate egos, yet lead to depression. However, according to the “alcohol myopia" theory,
a defining feature of alcohol is that it always narrows attention, which in turn causes
individuals to focus on simple, present, and salient cues. As a result, alcohol has particularly
strong effects in situations of “inhibition conflict," i.e. with two competing motivations,
one of which is simple, present, or salient, while the other is complicated, in the future,
or remote.4 The behavioral-economics interpretation of this theory is that alcohol causes
by Laibson (1997). Given the similarity of predicted responses of consumption patterns to price changes by
the two competing models, Gruber and Ko˝szegi (2001) were not able to reject Becker and Murphy’s (1988)
model in favor of their own. The ensuing literature produced suggestive but no conclusive evidence in the
smoking domain (Gruber and Mullainathan (2005)). Two recent examples in the context of alcohol consumption
found mixed results (Bernheim et al. (2012) and Hinnosaar (2012)). Finally, other theories predict demand for
commitment as well, including cue-based theories, dual-self models, or temptation and self-control models
as in Thaler and Shefrin (1981), Laibson (2001), Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), Bernheim and Rangel (2004), or
Fudenberg and Levine (2006). For detailed overviews on the empirical and theoretical literature on commitment
devices, see DellaVigna (2009) and Bryan et al. (2010).
4In a series of studies, Steele and several coauthors aimed to explain a range of social behaviors caused by
alcohol, emphasizing the effects of alcohol on aggression and altruism (Steele and Southwick (1985), Steele et al.
(1985)). These studies and subsequent work on alcohol myopia did not study savings decisions or intertemporal
4
present bias. The findings from my field experiment support this theory in the context of
savings decisions. They demonstrate that alcohol-induced myopia can have economically
meaningful consequences.
Moreover, this paper adds to the literature on poverty and self-control.5 With the
exception of Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010), this line of research has largely sought
to explain choices between overall levels of current and future consumption, rather than
to understand how and whether specific goods may cause time-inconsistent preferences.
In contrast, this paper argues that focusing on specific temptation goods may not only
be an effective way to help individuals overcome their self-control problems regarding
the consumption of these goods, but, in the case of alcohol, may also reduce self-control
problems in other domains.
This paper also contributes to the growing literature on saving decisions among the
poor (Karlan et al. (2014b)). The availability and design of savings accounts have recently
been found to be important determinants of savings behavior among the poor (Ashraf et al.
(2006), Dupas and Robinson (2013a), Dupas and Robinson (2013b), Prina (2014), Schaner
(2014), Kast et al. (2014), Brune et al. (2014), Karlan et al. (2014a)). Existing studies emphasize
the importance of technologies for committing to savings. This paper argues that helping
individuals to overcome underlying self-control problems regarding specific goods can
be a substitute for commitment devices for overall consumption-saving decisions. More
choice (Giancola et al. (2010)). However, many cross-sectional studies, including the ones on alcohol, found a
correlation between impulsive “delayed reward discounting" (DRD) and addictive behavior, without establishing
existence or direction of causality (MacKillopp et al. (2011), Vuchinich and Simpson (1999)). Experimental lab
studies consistently found that acute alcohol intoxication reduced inhibitory control in computer tasks (Perry
and Carroll (2008)), but the two studies conducted so far did not find effects on impulsive DRD (Richards et al.
(1999)). In fact, to their own surprise, Ortner et al. (2003) found that alcohol intoxication reduced impulsivity.
My study differs from previous experimental studies in a number of ways. In particular, (i) the duration of the
experiment was significantly longer (over three weeks vs. one day), (ii) sample characteristics were markably
different (low-income workers vs. college students; higher levels of regular drinking), (iii) stakes were higher
(relative to income), and (iv) the main outcome was the amount saved after three weeks (as opposed to impulsive
DRD).
5This literature goes back to at least Fisher (1930). It was recently revived by several theoretical and empirical
contributions. On the theory side, Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010) and Bernheim et al. (2014) investigated
the possibility of a poverty trap due to the association between poverty and self-control. Recent research on
the empirical side includes Mani et al. (2013) and Mullainathan and Shafir (2013). For an excellent review, see
Haushofer and Fehr (2014).
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generally, it argues that time preferences are endogenous, in line with Becker and Mulligan
(1997), and, more recently in the context of saving among the poor, Carvalho et al. (2014).
The results from this paper have the potential to inform alcohol policy, a much-debated
topic in developing countries. In India, states have chosen a wide range of policy options
ranging from prohibition (Gujarat) to government provision (Tamil Nadu), and private
provision (Delhi) of alcohol.6 When making such choices, policymakers lack sufficient
information on the causes and the impact of alcohol consumption, and the feasibility and
effectiveness of policy options. This paper contributes to this knowledge by investigating
the relationship between alcohol and self-control, a key aspect in the consideration of policy
options such as “sin taxes" or prohibition.
Finally, this paper contributes to our understanding of the effectiveness of incentives
to encourage health-related behavior. Financial incentives are among the most successful
policies to reduce drug consumption in general (Anderson et al. (2009)), and alcohol con-
sumption in particular (Wagenaar et al. (2009)).7 Providing short-run financial or other
incentives can have substantial short-term and long-term effects on a number of health-
related behaviors (Petry et al. (2000), Prendergast et al. (2006), Volpp et al. (2008), Charness
and Gneezy (2009), Higgins et al. (2012), Dupas (2014)). In contrast to existing studies, I
do not find evidence of effects of short-run incentives on alcohol consumption beyond the
incentivized period.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides an overview of
the study background, including alcohol consumption patterns in Chennai and in developing
countries more generally. Section 1.3 describes the experimental design, characterizes the
study sample, and discusses randomization checks. Section 1.4 then considers the effect of
6See Rahman (2003) for a review of alcohol policy in India. In a major policy shift, Kerala has recently opted
to move from government provision of alcohol to prohibition within the next ten years.
7This is the case for both incentives in the form of increased prices or taxes, even for heavy drinkers (Chetty
et al. (2009), Cook and Tauchen (1982)), and in the form of contingency management, i.e. the use of monetary or
non-monetary incentives for changing health-related behavior modification, and behavior therapy, especially in
the addiction field (Higgins and Petry (1999)). However, the vast majority of these studies were conducted in
developed countries such that evidence from developing countries is limited.
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increased sobriety on savings, and Section 1.5 investigates the interaction between sobriety
and commitment savings. Section 1.6 considers the extent to which self-control problems
contribute to the demand for alcohol. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Alcohol in Chennai, India, and Developing Countries
There is scarce information regarding drinking patterns in developing countries, especially
among the poor. In this section, I first describe alcohol consumption patterns among low-
income individuals in Chennai, India. I then relate the observed patterns to existing data on
alcohol consumption in India and in other developing countries.
1.2.1 Alcohol Consumption in Chennai
As a first step toward a systematic understanding of the prevalence of drinking among
male manual laborers in developing countries, I conducted a short survey with 1,227 men
from ten different low-income professions in Chennai.8 Surveyors approached individuals
from these groups during the day and asked whether they were willing to answer a short
questionnaire about their alcohol consumption and take a breathalyzer test.9 Figures 5.1
through 5.4 show summary statistics of drinking patterns for these professions, based on
these surveys.
The overall prevalence of alcohol consumption among low-income men is high (Figure
5.1). 76.1 percent of individuals reported drinking alcohol on the previous day, ranging
across professions from 37 percent (porters) to as high as 98 percent (sewage workers).10 In
8The prevalence of alcohol consumption among women in Chennai and in India overall is substantially lower.
It has been consistently estimated to be below five percent in India, with higher estimates for North-Eastern
states and lower estimates for Tamil Nadu (where Chennai is located) and other South Indian states (Benegal
(2005)). In the most recent National Family Health Survey (Round 3, 2005/6), the prevalence of reported female
alcohol consumption was 2.2 percent (IIPS and International (2008)). It is highest in the lowest wealth (6.2
percent) and education (4.3 percent) quintiles.
9To ensure a high participation rate, individuals were given Rs. 20 ($0.33) for their participation in this short
survey. As result, only five out of 1,232 individuals approached declined to participate.
10Porters are individuals who help carry luggage or other items at train stations. Sewage workers spend
their days working, and sometimes swimming, in waist-deep human sewage. These individuals report drinking
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addition, on days when individuals consume alcohol, they drink considerable quantities
of alcohol (Figure 5.2). Conditional on drinking alcohol on the previous day, men of the
different professions reported drinking average amounts ranging from 3.8 to 6.5 standard
drinks on this day.11 Since alcohol is an expensive good, the resulting income shares spent
on alcohol are enormous (Figure 5.3). On average, individuals reported spending between
9.2 and 43.0 percent of their daily income of Rs. 300 ($5) to Rs. 500 ($8) on alcohol. These
numbers are particularly remarkable because many low-income men in Chennai are the
sole income earners of their families.12 Finally, 25.2 percent of individuals were inebriated
or drunk during these surveys, which all took place during the day (Figure 5.4).13
1.2.2 Alcohol Consumption in India and in Developing Countries
The substantial level of alcohol consumption among low-income groups in Chennai shown in
Figures 5.1 through 5.4 raises the question of how these numbers compare to other estimates
for Chennai, for India, and for developing countries overall. Limited data availability
and data inconsistencies make answering this question difficult. In particular, data on
breathalyzer scores are rare. However, there is reason to believe that the estimates for
Chennai are not unusual compared to other parts of India or other developing countries.
The daily average quantity of alcohol consumed by male drinkers in India, about a
quarter of the male population, is only slightly higher than the average of the physical
heavily before and during work to numb themselves, in particular to the smell.
11I follow the US definition of a standard drink as described in WHO (2001). According to this definition, a
standard drink contains 14 grams of pure ethanol. A small bottle of beer (330 ml at 5% alcohol), a glass of wine
(140 ml at 12% alcohol), or a shot of hard liquor (40 ml at 40% alcohol) each contain about one standard drink.
12The surveys reported here do not include questions about other family members and their incomes.
However, female labor market participation is relatively low in Chennai. In my sample, less than a third of
married men report that their wives earned income during the past month.
13Compared to other professions, the fraction of inebriated sewage workers is low given their reported
expenditures and consumption. Anecdotally, this is explained by the fact that about a month before the surveys
took place, one of the workers drowned in the sewage and his family was not given any severance payment
because he was found to have been drunk at the time of the accident in an autopsy. After this incident, sewage
workers stopped drinking at work, at least temporarily. Most individuals continued drinking alcohol regularly,
but they did not drink during work hours.
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quantities shown in Figure 5.2 (WHO (2014)). The average male Indian drinker consumes
about five standard drinks per day, exceeding the estimates for German, American, and
even Russian drinkers in the same WHO (2014) report.14 In comparison, individuals who
drank alcohol on the previous day in Chennai report on average drinking about 5.3 standard
drinks per day. Looking beyond India, male drinkers in Uganda (56 percent of the male
population) consume about 4 standard drinks per day. The prevalence of male alcohol
consumption is somewhat lower in other Sub-Saharan countries, but the physical quantities
consumed by drinkers are similarly high.15 Alcohol consumption has also been steeply
on the rise in China in recent years. According to the most recent WHO estimates, male
Chinese drinkers (58.4 percent of the male population) consume 2.9 standard drinks per day.
There is also evidence that heavy alcohol consumption is more prevalent among the
poor in developing countries. In India, both the prevalence of drinking and heavy alcohol
consumption are more common among low-income and low-education individuals (Neufeld
et al. (2005), Subramanian et al. (2005), IIPS and International (2007)).
Moreover, surveys among low-income groups show a commonly held belief that the
positive correlation between excessive alcohol consumption and poverty reflects a causal
relationship. For instance, in village surveys in Uganda, 56 percent of individuals believed
that excessive alcohol consumption was a cause of poverty (USAID (2003)). Strikingly, this
percentage was higher than the percentages of individuals that believed “lack of education
and skills," “lack of access to financial assistance and credit,” or “idleness and laziness,"
caused poverty. At the same time, a quarter of individuals viewed excessive alcohol
consumption as an outcome of poverty.
14Some assumptions in this calculation can be questioned. In particular, the WHO (2014) calculates the
number of drinks per drinker and day by dividing an estimate of the overall quantity consumed by the estimated
fraction of drinkers in the population. Hence, underestimating the prevalence of alcohol consumption among
males in India could lead to overestimates of the number of standard drinks per drinker. However, even
adjusting for the somewhat higher prevalence according to IIPS and International (2007), 31.9 percent rather
than 24.8 percent in WHO (2014), yields just over four standard drinks per drinker and day. In addition, other
studies find significantly lower prevalence of drinking in India (e.g. Subramanian et al. (2005)).
15For instance, an average drinker in Rwanda is estimated to consume 4.2 standard drinks per day. These
numbers are similar for Burundi (4.1 standard drinks), Kenya (3.5 standard drinks), and Tanzania (3.4 standard
drinks).
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1.3 Experimental Design and Balance Checks
The first part of this section consists of a broad overview of the experimental design of
my study. Next, I describe the recruitment and screening procedures and, hence, the
selection mechanism of potential study participants into the study. I then provide detailed
information about the timeline and the treatment conditions, followed by a description of
the mechanism used to elicit willingness to pay for sobriety incentives and the outcomes of
interest of the experiment. Finally, I discuss summary statistics for the study sample and
balance checks.
1.3.1 Overview of Experimental Design
Between April and September 2014, I asked 229 cycle-rickshaw peddlers working in central
Chennai to visit a nearby study office every day for three weeks each. During these daily
visits, study participants completed a breathalyzer test and a short survey on labor supply,
earnings, and expenditure patterns on the previous day, and alcohol consumption both on
the previous day and on the same day before coming to the study office. To study the impact
of increased sobriety due to financial incentives on savings behavior, all subjects were given
the opportunity to save money at the study office. Additionally, participants were randomly
assigned to varying conditions with the following considerations. First, to create exogenous
variation in sobriety, a randomly selected subsample of study participants was offered
financial incentives to visit the study office sober while the remaining individuals were paid
for coming to the study office regardless of their alcohol consumption. Second, to examine
the interaction between sobriety incentives and commitment savings, a cross-randomized
subset of individuals was provided with a commitment savings account, i.e. their savings
account did not allow them to withdraw their savings until the end of their participation in
the study. Finally, to identify self-control problems regarding alcohol, a randomly selected
subset of individuals was given the choice between incentives for sobriety and unconditional
payments.
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1.3.2 Recruitment and Screening
The study population consisted of male cycle-rickshaw peddlers aged 25 to 60 in Chennai,
India.16 Individuals enrolled in the study went through a three-stage recruitment and
screening process. Due to capacity constraints, enrollment was conducted on a rolling basis
such that there were typically between 30 and 60 participants enrolled in the study at any
given point in time.
Field recruitment and screening. Field surveyors approached potential participants during
work hours near the study office, and asked interested individuals to answer a few questions
to determine their eligibility to participate in “a paid study in Chennai." Individuals were
eligible to proceed to the next stage if they met the following screening criteria: (i) between
25 and 60 years old, inclusive, (ii) fluent in Tamil, the local language, (iii) worked at least five
days per week on average as a rickshaw puller during the previous month, (iv) having lived
in Chennai for at least six months, (v) without plans to leave Chennai during the ensuing
six weeks, and (vi) reporting an average daily consumption of 0.7 to 2.0 “quarters" of hard
liquor (equivalent to 3.0 to 8.7 standard drinks) per day.17 If an individual satisfied all field
screening criteria, he was invited to visit the study office to learn more about the study and
to complete a more thorough screening survey to determine his eligibility.
Office screening. The primary goal of the more detailed office screening procedure was to
reduce the risks associated with the study, in particular risks related to alcohol withdrawal
symptoms. The criteria used in this procedure included screening for previous and current
16The study population included both passenger cycle-rickshaw peddlers as in Schofield (2014) and cargo
cycle-rickshaw peddlers. Schofield (2014) exclusively enrolled passenger-rickshaw peddlers with a body-
mass index (BMI) below 20. To avoid overlap between the two samples, my study only enrolled passenger
cycle-rickshaw peddler with a BMI above 20. There was no BMI-related restriction for cargo cycle-rickshaw
peddlers.
17“Quarters" refer to small bottles of 180 ml each. Nearly 100% of drinkers among cycle-rickshaw peddlers
(and most other low-income populations in Chennai) consume exclusively hard liquor, specifically rum or
brandy. The drinks individuals consume contain over 40 percent alcohol by volume (80 proof) and they
maximize the quantity of alcohol per rupee. One quarter of hard liquor is equivalent to approximately 4.35
standard drinks.
12
medical conditions such as seizures, liver diseases, previous withdrawal experiences, and
intake of several sedative medications and medications for diabetes and hypertension. This
thorough medical screening procedure was strictly necessary since reducing one’s alcohol
consumption (particularly subsequent to extended periods of heavy drinking) can lead to
serious withdrawal symptoms. If not adequately treated, individuals can develop delirium
tremens, a severe and potentially even lethal medical condition (Wetterling et al. (1994),
Schuckit et al. (1995)).
Lead-in period. Overall attrition and, in particular, differential attrition are first-order
threats to the validity of any randomized-controlled trial. In my study, attrition was of
particular concern since the study requested participants to visit the study office for three
weeks every day with varying payment structures across treatment groups. In early-stage pi-
loting, a non-negligible fraction of individuals visited the study office on the first day, which
provided high renumeration to compensate for the time-consuming enrollment procedures,
but then dropped out of the study relatively quickly. To avoid this outcome in the actual
study, participants were required to attend on three consecutive study days (the “lead-in
period”) before being fully enrolled in the study and informed about their treatment status.
Individuals were informed about this feature of the study during their first visit to the study
office. They were allowed to repeat the lead-in period if they missed one or more of the
three consecutive days. However, individuals were only allowed to repeat the lead-in period
once.
Selection. At each stage, between 64 and 83 percent of individuals were able and willing to
proceed to the subsequent stage (Table 1.1). Among individuals who were approached on
the street to conduct the field screening survey, 64 percent were eligible and decided to visit
the study office to complete the office screening survey. 21 percent were either not willing
to participate in the survey when first approached (14 percent), or were not interested in
learning more about the study after participating in the survey and being found to be eligible
13
(7 percent). The majority among the remaining individuals (12 percent) participated in the
survey, but did not meet the drinking criteria outlined above, primarily because they were
abstinent from alcohol or reported drinking less than 3 standard drinks per day on average
(11 percent). During the next stage, the office screening survey, 83 percent of individuals
were found eligible. The majority of the remaining, ineligible individuals (13 percent) were
not able to participate due to medical reasons. Finally, 66 percent of individuals passed the
lead-in period. Importantly, leaving the study at this stage does not appear to be related
to alcohol consumption as measured by individuals’ sobriety during their first visit to the
study office.
1.3.3 Timeline and Treatment Groups
Figure 1.1 provides an overview of the study timeline, the different activities, and the
treatment conditions. All participants completed five phases of the study as described
in more detail below. During the first four phases, consisting of 20 study days in total,
individuals were asked to visit the study office every day, excluding Sundays, at a time of
their choosing between 6 pm and 10 pm. The office was located in the vicinity of their usual
area of work to limit the time required for the visit. During Phase 1, the first four days of
the study, all individuals were paid Rs. 90 ($1.50) for visiting the study office, regardless of
their blood alcohol content (BAC). This period served to gather baseline data in the absence
of incentives and to screen individuals for willingness to visit the study office regularly.
On day 4, individuals were randomly allocated to one of the following three experimental
conditions for the subsequent 15 days.
(I) Control Group. The Control Group was paid Rs. 90 ($1.50) per visit regardless of
BAC on days 5 through 19. These participants simply continued with the payment
schedule from Phase 1.
(II) Incentive Group. The Incentive Group was given incentives for sobriety on days 5
through 19. These payments consisted of Rs. 60 ($1) for visiting the study office, and
14
Table 1.1: Eligibility Status at Different Recruitment Stages
STAGE FRACTION
(1) Field Screening Survey
Eligible and willing to participate 64%
Not willing to conduct survey 14%
Drinks too little to be eligible 11%
Drinks too much to be eligible 1%
Ineligible for other reasons 3%
Eligible, but not interested 7%
(2) Office Screening Survey
Eligible in Office Screening 83%
Ineligible for medical reasons 13%
Ineligible for other reasons 4%
(3) Lead-in Period
Proceeded to enrollment 66%
Didn’t proceed and BAC = 0 on day 1 19%
Didn’t proceed and BAC > 0 on day 1 15%
Notes: This table gives an overview of the three-stage screening process of the study.
1. For each stage, it shows the fraction of individuals who were eligible and willing to proceed to the next stage
of the study, the reasons for individuals not to proceed, and the relative frequencies of these reasons (each
conditional on reaching the respective stage).
2. The tiers of the selection process are (1) the field screening survey (top panel), (2) the office screening survey
(center panel), and (3) the lead-in period (bottom panel).
15
an additional Rs. 60 if the individual was sober as measured by a score of zero on the
breathalyzer test. Hence, the payment was Rs. 60 if they arrived at the office with a
positive BAC and Rs. 120 if they arrived sober. Given the reported daily labor income
of about Rs. 300 ($5) in the sample, Rs. 60 ($1) was a relatively strong incentive for
sobriety.
(III) Choice Group. To familiarize individuals with the incentives, the Choice Group was
given the same incentives as the Incentive Group in Phase 2 (days 5 to 7). Then, right
before the start of Phase 3 (day 7) and Phase 4 (day 13), they were asked to choose for
the subsequent week (six study days) whether they preferred to continue receiving
the same incentives, or to receive unconditional payments ranging from Rs. 90 ($1.50)
to Rs. 150 ($2.50), as described below.
Eliciting willingness to pay for incentives. On days 7 and 13 of the study, surveyors
elicited individuals’ preferences in each of the three choices shown in Table 1. Each of these
choices consisted of a tradeoff between two options. The first option, Option A, was the
same for all choices. The payment structure in this option was the same as in the Incentive
Group, i.e. a payment of Rs. 60 ($1) for arriving with a positive BAC, and Rs. 120 ($2) for
arriving sober. In contrast, Option B varied across the three choices, with unconditional
amounts of Rs. 90, Rs. 120, and Rs. 150. To gather as much information as possible while
ensuring incentive compatibility, preferences for all three choices were elicited, before one
of these choices was randomly selected to be implemented.18 However, to maintain similar
average study payments across treatment groups, Choice 1 was implemented in 90 percent
of choice instances (independent over time) so that particularly high payments were only
18This is an application of the “random-lottery incentive system" (RLIS), in which a subject is asked to choose
in several choice situations, one of which is randomly selected to be implemented once all choices are made.
This method is extensively used in the experimental economics literature, for instance, recently by Augenblick
et al. (2014) or Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). Holt (1986) put forward a theoretical criticism suggesting that
subjects may not perceive every choice situation as isolated, but instead treat all choices as a grand meta-lottery.
However, in subsequent experimental work, Starmer and Sugden (1991) and Hey and Lee (2005) did not find
evidence in support of this concern. For a brief summary of the debate, see Wakker (2007).
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actually paid out to a small number of individuals in the Choice Group.19
Table 1.2: Choices between Incentives for Sobriety and Unconditional Payments
Option A Option B
Choice BAC > 0 BAC = 0 regardless of BAC
(1) Rs. 60 Rs. 120 Rs. 90
(2) Rs. 60 Rs. 120 Rs. 120
(3) Rs. 60 Rs. 120 Rs. 150
I designed these choices with two main objectives in mind: first, to elicit demand for
commitment to sobriety and, hence, potential self-control problems regarding alcohol con-
sumption; second, to allow the Choice Group to be part of the evaluation of the impact of
incentives for sobriety. In addition, given low literacy and numeracy levels in the study
sample, the design seeks to minimize the complexity of decisions while achieving the other
two objectives. In particular, Option A was the same across choices and individuals were
given three days to familiarize themselves with these incentives during Phase 2. Accordingly,
in all three choices, subjects knew Option A from previous office visits, and Option B was
simply a fixed payment regardless of BAC as already experienced in Phase 1. To address
potential concerns regarding anchoring effects, the order of choices was randomized. Half of
participants made their choices in the order as outlined above, and the remaining individuals
completed the choices in the opposite order.
19Before making their choices, study participants were told to take all choices seriously since each choice had
a positive probability of being implemented. Individuals were not informed regarding the specific probabilities
of implementing each of the choices. One potential concern regarding the procedure to elicit demand for
commitment in this study is that subjects’ choices may have been affected by the fact that none of the choices
were implemented with certainty. Such effects would be a particular concern for this study if they increased
the demand for commitment. However, the existing evidence suggests that introducing uncertainty into
intertemporal choices reduces present bias (as measured by the immediacy effect) rather than increasing it (Keren
and Roelofsma (1995); Weber and Chapman (2005)).
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Demand for commitment. The choice of the conditional payment (Option A) in Choice 1 is
not evidence of demand for commitment. An individual who did not prefer to change his
drinking patterns may have chosen Option A if he expected to visit the study office sober at
least 50 percent of the time and, therefore, to receive higher average study payments than
from choosing Option B. In contrast, study payments for Option A were weakly dominated
by the ones in Option B for Choice 2. Therefore, choosing Option A in Choice 2 is evidence
of demand for commitment to increase sobriety, which reveals underlying self-control
problems. Furthermore, study payments in Option A were strictly dominated by the ones in
Option B for Choice 3. Choosing Option A in Choice 3 implied sacrificing Rs. 30 ($0.50) in
study payments per day even during sober visits to the study office, a non-trivial amount
given reported labor income of about Rs. 300 ($5) per day.
Endline. On day 20 of the study, all participants were asked to come to the study office once
again for an endline visit at any time of the day of their choosing. No incentives for sobriety
were provided on this day. During this visit, surveyors conducted the endline survey with
individuals, and participants were we given the money they had saved. Moreover, all study
participants were given the same set of three choices, described above. This allows me to
understand whether exposure to incentives for sobriety affected subsequent demand for
incentives. Again, preferences for all three choices were elicited, and then one of them
was randomly selected to be implemented. However, the choices from day 20 were only
implemented for a randomly selected five percent of individuals for budgetary and logistical
reasons. These individuals were invited to visit the study office for six additional days.
The endline visit was the last scheduled visit to the study office for the remaining study
participants.
Follow-up visits. To measure the effects of the intervention beyond the incentivized
period, surveyors attempted to visit each study participant about one week after their last
scheduled office visit. This visit was announced during the informed consent procedures,
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and participants were reminded of this visit on day 20 of the study, but they were not
informed regarding the exact day of this visit. During the follow-up visit, individuals were
breathalyzed and surveyed once again on the main outcomes of interest. The compensation
for this visit did not depend on the individuals’ breathalyzer scores.
1.3.4 Lottery
In addition to the payments described above, study participants were given the opportunity
to earn additional study payments in a lottery on days 10 through 18 of the study. The
lottery was conducted as follows: If the participant arrived at the study office on a day on
which he was assigned to play the lottery, he was given the opportunity to spin a ‘wheel of
fortune’. This gave him the chance to win a voucher for Rs. 30 or Rs. 60, at a probability of
approximately 5 percent each. This voucher was valid only on the participant’s subsequent
study day, i.e. if the participant came back on the following study day and showed the
voucher, he received the equivalent cash amount at the beginning of his visit. The lottery
allows me 1) to estimate the impact of increased study payments on labor supply and
earnings, 2) to estimate the impact of study payments on attendance and savings at the
study office, and 3) to test whether sobriety incentives raised the marginal propensity to
save.
1.3.5 Outcomes of Interest and Savings Treatments
The main outcomes of interest in this study are: (i) alcohol consumption and expenditures,
(ii) savings behavior, and (iii) labor market participation and earnings. Each of these out-
comes is described below.
Alcohol consumption data was collected daily during each study office visit by measuring
individuals’ blood alcohol content (BAC), and via self-reports regarding drinking times,
quantities consumed and amounts spent on alcohol. BAC was measured via breathalyzer
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tests using devices with US Department of Transportation level of precision.20 During each
visit, after the breathalyzer test, individuals were asked about their alcohol consumption on
the same day prior to visiting the study office, and about their overall alcohol consumption
on the previous day. To cross-check self-reported drinking patterns, a randomly selected
subset of subjects was visited unannounced between 7:30 pm and 10 pm for random breath-
alyzer tests.21
Saving. To study individuals’ savings behavior, all individuals were given the opportunity
to save money in an individual savings box at the study office. During each office visit, study
participants could save up to Rs. 200, using either payments received from the study or
money from other sources. Two features of the savings opportunity were cross-randomized
to the sobriety incentive treatment groups.
(i) Matching contribution rate. Individuals were given a matching contribution (“savings
bonus") as an incentive to save. During their endline visit, subjects were paid out their
savings plus a matching contribution, randomized with equal probability to be either
10% or 20% of the amount saved. Hence, even in a setting with high daily interest
rates, saving money at the study office was a high-return activity for many study
participants.22
(ii) Commitment savings. Half of study participants were randomly selected to have
20As in Burghart et al. (2013), this study uses the breathalyzer model AlcoHawk PT500 (Q3 Innovations LLC).
For more information on the measurement of BAC via breathalyzers, see O’Daire (2009).
21Ideally these tests would have been conducted at later times in the night to fully capture individuals’
drinking patterns at night. However, staff constraints, safety considerations, and the intrusive nature of visiting
individuals late at night at their homes made it infeasible to conduct these tests after 10 pm. The random
breathalyzer tests were only conducted for the subset of individuals who consented to be visited unannounced.
However, since the renumeration for these visits was deliberately chosen to be high (Rs. 100 for a successful
visit regardless of the outcome of the breathalyzer test), the fraction of individuals that agreed to be randomly
breathalyzed was nearly 100 percent.
22Individuals found the matching contribution easier to understand rather than a daily interest rate on
savings during early-stage piloting work. The implied daily interest rate from saving an additional rupee
increased for each participant over the course of his participation in the study. However, anecdotal evidence
suggests that few individuals were aware of this feature.
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their savings account include a commitment feature. Instead of being able to withdraw
money during any of their daily visits between 6 pm and 10 pm, they were only
allowed to withdraw money at the end of their participation in the study.23 Notably,
the savings option for the remaining individuals also entailed a weak commitment
feature. While individuals could withdraw as much as they desired on any given
office visit, they were only able to withdraw money in the evenings, i.e. between 6 pm
and 10 pm.
The savings option served three purposes. First, it allows me to study the impact
of increased sobriety on savings behavior and, more generally, the impact of alcohol on
inter-temporal choices and investments in high return opportunities. Second, the cross-
randomized commitment savings feature allows to consider the relationship between sobri-
ety and self-control in savings decisions. Third, the savings feature was meant to help study
participants avoid using the money received from the study to drink alcohol on the same
evening or on subsequent days.
Labor market outcomes included reported earnings, labor supply, and productivity. These
outcomes are measured by individuals’ self-reports during the baseline survey, daily surveys,
and the endline survey. Reported earnings are a combination of income from rickshaw
work and other sources such as load work. Labor supply is a combination of the number of
days worked per week and the number of hours worked per day. Finally, productivity is
measured as income per hour worked.
1.3.6 Sample Characteristics and Randomization Checks
Appendix Tables 5.1 through 5.3 summarize study participants’ key background characteris-
tics, and demonstrate balance on these characteristics across treatment groups. Tables 5.1
and 5.2 give an overview of basic demographics, and work- and savings-related variables.
23For ethical reasons, all individual had the option to leave the study and withdraw all of their money at any
day in the study.
21
As to be expected with a large number of comparisons, there are imbalances across treatment
groups for some characteristics. However, overall only 5 out of 72 coefficients are statistically
significantly different at the 10 percent level, and 3 coefficients are significantly different at
the 5 percent level.24 Most notably among these, individuals in the Control Group reported
lower savings at baseline than in the Incentive and Choice Groups. Baseline savings are
calculated as the sum of amounts saved in a number of different options including savings
at home in cash or in gold or silver, with relatives and friends, with self-help groups, or
with shopkeepers, as reported in the baseline survey. There is no statistically significant
difference in the comparisons between the Incentive and Choice Group with the Control
Group individually. However, the difference in reported baseline savings is statistically sig-
nificant when comparing the Control Group to the Incentive and Choice Groups combined.
As illustrated in the Appendix Figure 5.5, this difference is driven entirely by six individuals
who reported very high savings, among them one individual in the Choice Group who
reported in the baseline survey having Rs. 1 million in cash savings at his home.25
Differences in reported baseline savings are not driving the savings result shown below.
First, there were only small and statistically insignificant differences in savings at the study
office across treatment groups in the unincentivized Phase 1 (last row of Table 5.2). Second,
controlling for Phase 1 savings and baseline survey variables, including total savings, does
not substantially alter the regression results. If anything, the estimated effect of sobriety
incentives on savings becomes larger. Third, there is no apparent relationship between
reported savings in the baseline survey and savings at the study office. Among the six
individuals with total savings above Rs. 200,000 in the baseline survey, four are in the Choice
Group, and two are in the Incentive Group.26 Only two of them, both in the Choice Group,
24Among the demographics in Table 5.1, the Control Group reports having lived for a few years longer in
Chennai, and they are more likely to have electricity and a TV. In addition, they are somewhat less likely to
own a rickshaw. In contrast, the overall fraction of individuals who reports ‘lack of money’ as a reason for not
owning a rickshaw is balanced across treatment groups. Other reasons for not owning a rickshaw include not
having a safe place to store it, or getting it provided by an employer.
25This amount was confirmed not only in the endline survey, but also during a subsequent follow-up visit.
26This outcome is more likely than it may seem. The probability of that none of the six high savers were
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saved more than the average study participant in the course of the study.27 However, their
influence on the below results is negligible, in particular because these individuals already
saved high amounts in the unincentivized Phase 1, and the below regressions control for
savings in Phase. Hence, excluding these two individuals from the analysis does not change
the conclusions of this paper.
Table 5.3 shows balance of alcohol consumption at baseline. Only one of the 36 com-
parisons shows a statistically significant difference at the 10 percent level. Compared
to the Control Group, individuals in the Choice Group report somewhat lower alcohol
expenditures per day.
allocated into the Control Group is (2/3)6 ≈ 9%.
27Three of the remaining four individuals saved a total of Rs. 50 or less, and the fourth individual saved Rs.
500 in the course of the study, i.e. about the average amount in the Control Group.
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1.4 Does Alcohol Affect Saving?
Time preferences are a fundamental aspect of decision-making and are critical for consumption-
saving decisions. Savings can increase future consumption and serve as a buffer against
adverse shocks, such as health emergencies. Accordingly, a growing body of recent research
has focused on savings behavior among the poor and the impact of offering different savings
accounts to low-income individuals in developing countries (Karlan et al. (2014b)). This liter-
ature largely focuses on the availability of different savings technologies and their potential
impact on savings behavior Ashraf et al. (2006) and other outcomes such as investment in
health (Dupas and Robinson (2013b)). There is less emphasis on determinants of savings
behavior for given technologies and on heterogeneity in take-up or impact. In this section,
I present evidence that alcohol distorts intertemporal choice by causing present bias, and
hence self-control problems in savings decisions. I show that increasing sobriety can impact
individuals’ savings behavior beyond effects on income net of alcohol expenditures. I
complement this evidence with Section 1.5, which shows that sobriety incentives lower the
impact of a commitment savings feature on savings.
Figure 1.2 shows a strong correlation between daily amounts saved at the study office
and blood alcohol content (BAC) measured during the same office visits, both across
Control Group participants and within the same individuals over time. Individuals who, on
average, exhibited higher sobriety also saved more. Moreover, individuals in the Control
Group saved more during study office visits with lower levels of inebriation than the same
individuals during high-inebriation visits. The remaining part of this section considers
whether this correlation reflects a causal impact of alcohol consumption on individuals’
savings behavior. Understanding the causal impact of alcohol on savings behavior requires
exogenous variation in sobriety. Therefore, I first consider the impact of financial incentives
on alcohol consumption. While the outcomes in this section are of interest in and of
themselves, they can also be viewed as a first stage for the subsequent analysis of the impact
of increased sobriety on savings decisions.
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Notes: This figure shows the correlation between breathalyzer scores during study office visits and amounts
saved at the study during the same visits for individuals in the Control Group. The top panel depicts a binned
scatter plot (including regression line) for all observations in the Control Group. The center panel shows the
same graph, controlling for individual fixed effects. The bottom panel depicts the correlation across study
participants by collapsing observations by individual.
Figure 1.2: Cross-sectional Relationship between Daily Amounts Saved and BAC
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1.4.1 The Impact of Incentives on Alcohol Consumption (First Stage)
Financial incentives significantly reduced daytime drinking, but they had only a moderate
effect on overall drinking. Table 1.3 give a summary of the results from this section. Since
estimated treatment effects of the Incentive and Choice Conditions on alcohol consumption
are remarkably similar, the table shows results from regressions that pool these two groups.
Both sobriety incentive treatments lowered daytime drinking (left panel of Table 1.3), as
measured by the fraction of individuals showing up sober, measured BAC, and the reported
number of standard drinks before coming to the study office. The estimated treatment
effects for all three measures correspond to a 33% change relative to the mean in the Control
Group. However, this effect translates into only a moderate reduction of overall drinking
(right panel of Table 1.3). Reductions in self-reported consumption and expenditures are
relatively small (5.0 to 9.5 percent decrease), and, while larger in relative terms, the effect on
reported abstinence is only moderate (2 percentage points) and not statistically significant.
The Impact of Sobriety Incentives on Daytime Drinking
The main outcome measure used to assess the impact of incentives on daytime drinking
is the fraction of individuals who arrived sober at the study office among all participants
who were enrolled (as opposed to only among individuals who visited the study office).
That is, anyone who did not visit the study office on a particular day is counted as “not
sober at the study office," along with individuals for whom a positive BAC was measured
when they visited the office. Since attendance in the Incentive Group is lower than in the
Control Group, this measure is preferable to other measures of sobriety as it less vulnerable
to attrition concerns.
Financial incentives significantly increased sobriety during the day, as measured by the
fraction of individuals who visited the study office and had a zero breathalyzer test result
among all individuals in the respective treatment groups (upper panel of Figure 1.3). In the
pre-incentive period, there are only small differences in sobriety across treatment groups. In
each group, about half of the individuals visited the study office sober on days 1 through 4.
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This fraction gradually decreased in the Control Group over the course of the study to about
35 percent by the end of the study.28 In contrast, with the start of the incentivized period
(day 5), sobriety in the Incentive and Choice Groups increased by about 15 percentage points.
Sobriety at the study office declined as well in the course of the study, but individuals in
these two groups remained about ten to fifteen percentage points more likely to visit the
study office sober than the Control Group through the end of the study.
Table 1.3: Summary of Estimated Effect of Incentives on Alcohol Consumption
Before/during visits Overall drinking
Control Change % Control Change %
Breathalyzer scores
Fraction sober/abstinent 0.39 +0.13∗∗∗ +33.3 0.10 +0.02 +19.0
BAC (%) 0.09 −0.03∗∗∗ –33.3 – – –
Self reports
# standard drinks 2.96 −0.98∗∗∗ –33.1 5.65 −0.28 –5.0
Expenditures (Rs/day) – – – 91.2 −8.7∗ –9.5
Notes: This table gives an overview of the estimated treatment effects on sobriety before/during the study office
visit (left panel) and overall alcohol consumption (right panel).
1. The table includes control means and estimated coefficients, both in absolute terms and as a share of the
respective control mean.
2. The coefficients shown are from pooled estimates (i.e. pooling the Incentive and Choice Groups) from Table
1.4 (left panel) and Table 1.5 (right panel), including Phase 1 and baseline survey controls.
3. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
Remarkably, the two treatments had a nearly identical effect on the fraction of individuals
who visited the study office sober. This is not a surprise in Phases 1 and 2 since the
payment structure was the same in the Incentive and Choice Groups at the beginning of the
study. However, overall sobriety levels in these two groups tracked each other even once
28The decline in sobriety in the Control Group over the course of the study is in part explained by lower
overall attendance in all treatment groups. In addition, individuals may have felt more comfortable visiting the
study office inebriated or drunk at later stages of the study.
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Notes: This figure shows sobriety and attendance over the course of the study for each of the three sobriety
incentive treatment groups.
1. The upper panel of this figure shows the fraction of individuals who visited the study office sober. The
indicator variable ‘sober at the study office’ takes on the value ‘1’ for a study participant on any given day of
the study if he (i) visited the study office on this day, and (ii) his breathalyzer test was (exactly) zero. The
variable is, hence, ‘0’ for individuals with a positive breathalyzer or those who did not visit the study office
on this day.
2. The lower panel of the figure shows the fraction of individuals who visited the study office. Since only
individuals who came to the study office on days 2 through 4 were fully enrolled in the study, by construction,
attendance is 100 percent on days 1 through 4.
Figure 1.3: Sobriety and Attendance by Alcohol Incentive Treatment Group
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individuals were given the choice of whether they wanted to continue receiving incentives
at the beginning of Phase 3. The Incentive Group was only slightly more likely to visit the
study office sober compared to the Choice Group in Phase 4. The similarity of drinking
patterns in the Choice and Incentive Groups suggests sophistication regarding the effect of
the incentives on individuals’ sobriety. The subset of study participants who would have
increased their sobriety during study office visits if they had been provided with incentives
also chose to receive the incentives when given the choice.29
The corresponding regressions in Table 1.4 confirm the visual results. Individuals in
the Incentive and Choice Group were approximately ten percentage points more likely to
visit the study office sober, respectively (column 1). The estimates increase to 13 percentage
points when regressions include baseline survey and Phase 1 control variables, in particular
sobriety in Phase 1 (columns 2 to 4). This estimate corresponds to a 33 percent increase
compared to the Control Group. Conditional on visiting the study office, individuals’
measured BAC in the Incentive Group was four percentage points lower than in the Control
Group (columns 5 through 7). The estimate is smaller for the Choice Group, which translates
into a lower pooled estimate (column 8). Nonetheless, the three percentage-point decrease
in BAC shown represents a 33 percent reduction compared to the Control Group. Moreover,
both treatments reduced the reported number of drinks before visiting the study office
by about one standard drink from a base of just under three standard drinks (columns
9 through 12). The point estimate for the pooled treatment effect, 0.98 standard drinks
(column 12), corresponds to a reduction of 33 percent as well.
The Impact of Sobriety Incentives on Overall Drinking
The estimated treatment effect on overall alcohol consumption is substantially lower than
the estimated effect on daytime drinking (Table 1.5). First, both treatments reduced reported
29This assumes that self-imposed and external incentives were equally effective, which may not have been
the case. For instance, external incentives may have decreased intrinsic motivation to stay sober (Bénabou and
Tirole (2003)).
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overall alcohol consumption by about 0.3 standard drinks per day (columns 1 to 4), about
a third of the effect on the reported number of drinks before coming to the study office
described above. None of these estimates are statistically significant. Second, the reduction
at the extensive margin of drinking was small at best (columns 5 to 8). The point estimate
for the pooled treatment effect suggests a 2 percentage point increase in reported abstinence
from drinking altogether (column 8), but none of the estimates are statistically significant
either. Third, the treatment effect on reported overall alcohol expenditures is about Rs.
10 per day (columns 9 to 12), with a point estimate of Rs. 8.7 for the pooled treatment
effect, statistically significant at the ten percent level. Taken together, these estimates
provide evidence that subjects who responded to the incentives mostly shifted their alcohol
consumption to later times of the day rather than reducing their overall consumption, or
not drinking at all.
The Role of Differential Attendance
The estimated effect of incentives on sobriety was not caused by differences in attendance
across treatment groups. Across all treatment groups and days of the study, attendance was
high (lower panel of Figure 1.3).30 However, compared to the Choice and Control Groups,
individuals in the Incentive Group were 7 percentage points less likely to visit the study
office post Phase 1. This attendance gap emerged with the start of sobriety incentives, and
remained relatively constant thereafter. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this difference
in attendance was caused by individuals in the Incentive Group who were not able or
willing to remain sober until their study office visit on some days, and, hence, faced reduced
incentives to visit the study office on these days. This explanation is consistent with the
fact that there was no attendance gap between the Choice and Control Groups because
individuals for whom sobriety incentives were not effective or preferable could select out of
30Attendance was 88.4 percent overall and 85.4 percent post treatment assignment. By construction, atten-
dance in the lead-in period (Phase 1) was 100 percent.
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them.31
On average, the Incentive Group was seven to eight percentage points less likely to
visit the study office compared to the Control Group (column 1 of Table 1.6). Moreover,
though not statistically significant, surprisingly, higher sobriety during the unincentivized
Phase 1 negatively predicts subsequent attendance (column 2). This appears to be the case
in the Incentive and Control Groups, but not in the Choice Group (column 3). Finally,
on average, participants with higher savings in Phase 1 exhibited significantly higher
subsequent attendance (column 4). However, there is no evidence that the two treatments
caused high savers to visit the study office more frequently. If anything, the opposite was the
case (column 5). This suggests that differential attendance of high savers does not explain
the savings results shown below.
1.4.2 Did Increased Sobriety Change Savings Behavior?
Both sobriety incentive treatments increased savings at the study office (upper panel of
Figure 1.4). Until day 4, when individuals learnt about their incentive treatment status,
average amounts saved were nearly identical across treatment groups. After the start of the
incentivized period, individuals in the Incentive and Choice Groups saved 46 percent and
65 percent more until the end of the study (Rs. 446 and Rs. 505 in the Incentive and Choice
Groups, respectively, compared to Rs. 306 in the Control Group). The difference in savings
across treatment groups did not emerge immediately after the beginning of the incentivized
period, but accumulated mainly between days 8 and 15.
The corresponding regression results in Table 1.7 confirm the visual evidence. Individuals
in both the Incentive and Choice Groups saved more at the study office, though only the
coefficient for the Choice Group is statistically significant at the 10 percent level in the
specification without controls (column 1). The pooled estimate shows a treatment effect of
Rs. 12.45, corresponding to an increase of 61 percent compared to Control Group savings
31However, it remains unclear why there is an attendance gap for the Choice Group on days 5 through 7 of
the study.
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Figure 1.4: Cumulative Savings by Day in Study
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of Rs. 20.42 (column 6). This estimate–as well as both individual estimates in column 1–is
larger than the coefficients for both the high matching contribution and the commitment
savings option. Incentives for sobriety had a larger effect than increasing the matching
contribution on savings from 10 to 20 percent, or introducing a commitment feature on
the savings option.32 Importantly, these estimates are ITT estimates, i.e. they measure the
impact of offering incentives for sobriety. While only effective for a relatively small fraction
of individuals as shown above, sobriety incentives increased savings by 61% overall.33
32As discussed above, even individuals in the “no commitment savings" group were given a weak commit-
ment feature since they were only able to withdraw money during their study visits between 6 pm and 10
pm. Hence, the estimate for “commitment savings" is likely an underestimate of the impact of commitment on
savings.
33Since BAC levels differed across treatment groups conditional on visiting the study office with a positive
blood alcohol content, using the difference in the fraction sober to calculate a ToT is not accurate.
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1.4.3 Robustness and Potential Confounds
Before examining the potential channels of the described effect of sobriety incentives on
savings, this subsection investigates three potential confounds.
Pre-existing differences across treatment groups do not explain the observed differences
in savings after day 4. The amounts saved by day 4 are nearly identical across treatment
groups (upper panel of Figure 1.4). Moreover, controlling for baseline savings and baseline
survey characteristics both decreases standard errors and increases point estimates (columns
2 of Table 1.7). The resulting point estimate for the pooled regression in column 4 is Rs.
13.44 and statistically significant at the 1 percent level (column 7 of Table 1.7).
Differential study payments across treatment groups could have been responsible for the
increase in savings in the two treatment groups. Indeed, the Choice Group received slightly
higher study payments (Rs. 7 per day) compared to the Control Group. However, the
Incentive Group received in fact slightly lower study payments (lower panel of Figure 1.4),
which implies that differences in average study payments cannot explain higher savings
in both treatment groups. Consistent with this, controlling for study payments does not
substantially alter the estimated treatment effects (columns 3 and 8 in Table 1.7). The
estimate for the pooled treatment effect decreases slightly to Rs. 11.57 per day.
Differential attendance could have caused the increase in savings. However, as discussed
in Section 1.4.1, while attendance was nearly identical in the Choice and Control Groups, it
was in fact significantly lower in the Incentive Group (lower panel of Figure 1.3). In addition,
if anything, the two treatments caused high savers to visit the study office less (column 5 of
Table 1.6). Accordingly, restricting the sample to days when individuals showed up at the
study office increases the estimated treatment effects (columns 4, 5, 9, and 10 of Table 1.7).
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1.4.4 The Effect of Changes in Income Net of Alcohol Expenditures
This paper argues increased sobriety caused changes in time preferences, which in turn
increased savings. An alternative or complementary channel could be increased income net
of alcohol expenditures, either due to reduced overall alcohol expenditures or increased
earnings. This section considers the contribution of these channels to the increase in savings.
I estimate this contribution to be about one half of the treatment effect on savings, and
attribute the remaining share to a change in preferences.
Estimating the Marginal Propensity to Save
Assessing the contribution of increased resources requires knowledge of the marginal
propensity to save out of additional resources, which the lottery allows me to estimate.
Table 1.8 shows regressions of the daily amounts saved on a dummy for the pooled alcohol
treatment as well as the amount won in the lottery on the previous day, and interactions
of the treatment dummies with the lottery amount.34 These regressions show a marginal
propensity to save of 0.15 to 0.21 in the Control Group, and 0.36 to 0.37 in the pooled alcohol
treatment groups. The below calculations use the marginal propensity to save from the
Control Group in the preferred specification in column 4 of Table 1.8.
The estimates in Table 1.8 provide additional suggestive evidence that increasing sobriety
affected time preferences. While the difference is not statistically significant, the estimated
marginal propensity to save is higher (0.37, statistically significant at the 5 percent level) for
the two groups that received sobriety incentives compared to the Control Group (0.21, not
significant). Importantly, this difference is unlikely to be explained by the aforementioned
confounds or increases in overall resources, since they are conditional on participating in
the lottery.
34The regressions also control for whether the lottery was conducted on the previous day.
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Table 1.8: The Marginal Propensity to Save out of Lottery Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Rs saved Rs saved Rs saved Rs saved
Pooled alcohol treatment 12.32* 11.71* 15.03*** 14.44***
(6.256) (6.110) (5.174) (5.202)
Amount won in lottery on previous study day 0.29* 0.29**
(0.166) (0.143)
Pooled alcohol treatment X Lottery amount 0.36* 0.36**
(0.192) (0.162)
Control Group X Lottery amount 0.15 0.16
(0.295) (0.261)
Observations 3,435 3,435 3,435 3,435
R-squared 0.008 0.008 0.117 0.118
Baseline survey controls NO NO YES YES
Phase 1 controls NO NO YES YES
Control mean 20.42 20.42 20.42 20.42
Notes: This table shows estimates of the impact of lottery winnings on the amounts saved at the study office.
1. All regressions use data from day 5 (the first day of sobriety incentives) through day 19 (the last day of
sobriety incentives) of the study. The outcome variable is the amount saved at the study office. If an
individual did not visit the study office on any given day of the study, the amount saved is set to zero on
this day. Similarly, the daily study payment is zero for those observations.
2. The lottery was conducted on days 10 through 18 of the study. All regressions control for whether individuals
participated in the lottery on any given day. Lottery winnings were Rs. 0 (no win), Rs. 30, or Rs. 60. If an
individual won in the lottery, he was given a personalized voucher for the respective amount (Rs. 30 or Rs.
60) that was redeemable only by this individual only on the subsequent study day.
3. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by individual. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent level, respectively. Phase 1 and baseline survey controls are the same as in the above tables.
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The Effect of Reduced Alcohol Expenditures on Savings
Cycle-rickshaw peddlers spend a large fraction of their income on alcohol, on average,
about Rs. 100 per day. Hence, even relatively small reductions in alcohol consumption
can significantly increase the overall resources available. The above estimates find that
the two treatments decreased alcohol expenditures by between Rs. 4.7 (using the implied
expenditure reduction based on the reported physical quantities consumed) to Rs. 8.7 per
day (using the estimate from reported expenditures). Combining these estimates with the
estimated marginal propensity to save from available resources of 0.21 in the Control Group
(column 4 of Table 1.8) implies that reduced alcohol expenditures account for Rs. 1.0 to Rs.
1.8 of the increase in savings.35
The Effect of Increased Earnings on Savings
Alcohol consumption may interfere with individuals’ ability to earn income.36 In addition
to reduced alcohol expenditures, the treatments may have affected available resources via
increased earnings. However, while positive, I estimate the effect of sobriety incentives on
earnings to be relatively small and statistically insignificant, with a point estimate for the
pooled treatment effect of Rs. 17.8 per day (columns 1 through 3 of Table 1.9.) Combined
with the marginal propensity to save from above, this estimate implies that increased
earnings account for Rs. 3.7 in increased savings. Similarly, the estimates on labor supply
35I use the estimated marginal propensity from the Control Group since the purpose of this exercise is to
understand the effect of increased resources for given preferences, i.e. under the null hypothesis of unchanged
preferences.
36Irving Fisher (1926) was among the first to investigate the relationship between alcohol and productivity.
Based on small-sample experiments by Miles (1924) that showed negative effects of alcohol on typewriting
efficiency, he argued that drinking alcohol slowed down the “human machine". He also argued that industrial
efficiency was one of the main reasons behind the introduction of alcohol prohibition in the US. While
many studies since Fisher (1926) have considered the relationship between alcohol consumption, income, and
productivity (for an overview, see of the European Alcohol and Forum (2011)), there is a dearth of well-identified
studies of the causal effect of alcohol on earnings and productivity, especially in developing countries. Cook
and Moore (2000) summarized the literature as follows: “Modern scholars studying productivity effects have
enjoyed larger sample sizes but unlike Fisher have utilized non-experimental data. The typical econometric
study estimates the productivity effects of drinking, utilizing survey data in which respondents are asked
about their drinking, work, income, and other items. The dependent variable is a measure of earnings or
hours worked, while the key independent variable is a measure of the quantity or pattern of contemporaneous
drinking, or alcohol-related psychiatric disorder (alcohol dependence or abuse)."
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are relatively small and not statically significant (columns 4 through 9 of Table 1.9). In fact,
the estimates of the treatment effect on labor supply at the extensive margin (i.e. whether an
individual worked at all on any given day) is negative (columns 4 through 6). In contrast,
the estimates on hours worked overall are positive in most specifications (columns 7 and 9).
Importantly, the estimates from this paper do not imply that alcohol does not have
important effects on labor market outcomes for at least three reasons. First, the estimates in
Table 1.9 are relatively imprecise. Since, while large in relative terms, the effect of incentives
on daytime drinking is only moderate in absolute terms (13 percentage points), I cannot
rule out large effects of daytime drinking on labor market behavior. Thus a more powerful
intervention to reduce daytime drinking would have caused larger effects. Second, the
impact of reduced drinking in the medium or long run might be much larger than the
short-run effects considered in this paper. Third, the potentially negative impact of alcohol
on productivity and labor supply via reduced physical or cognitive function may have been
mitigated by analgesic effects of alcohol, which may not be the case in other settings.
1.4.5 Accounting for Mechanical Effects
Table 1.10 shows a decomposition of the effect of incentives on savings. This composition
considers what share of the increase in savings is explained by mechanical effects, i.e. by
individuals having increased resources for given preferences. The starting point in this
decomposition is the estimate of Rs. 11.57 for the overall pooled treatment effect in column 8
of Table 1.7 (which controls for study payments). From this effect, I subtract the contribution
of the two effects described above: (i) the contribution of reduced alcohol expenditures, and
(ii) the contribution of increased earnings. This leaves an unexplained treatment effect of Rs.
6.00, i.e. about half of the overall treatment effect, and about 29% of control group savings.
I attribute this share of the increase in savings to the effect of increased sobriety on time
preferences. This argument is further supported by the next section, which shows evidence
that sobriety incentives and commitment savings are substitutes.
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Table 1.10: Decomposing the Impact of Incentives on Savings
Estimated overall treatment effect Rs. 11.57
Resource effect 1: reduced expenditures Rs. 1.83
Resource effect 2: increased earning Rs. 3.74
Remaining treatment effect Rs. 6.00
1.4.6 Household Resources and Complementary Consumption
This subsection addresses two additional concerns regarding the above findings. First, the
increase in savings at the study office due to increased sobriety may have come at the cost
of reduced household resources. Second, reduced alcohol consumption during the day or
overall may have lowered complementary consumption such as smoking.
Household Resources
The increase in savings due to the incentives treatments does not appear to have crowded
out money spent on family resources (Table 5.4). While not statistically significant, I find that
sobriety incentives increased money given to wives by about Rs. 17.4 (columns 1 through 3).
In contrast, resources spent on other family expenses decreased by about Rs. 8.9 (columns 4
through 6) such that reported resources spent on family expenses overall increased by about
Rs. 8.6 (columns 7 through 9).
Food Expenditures and Complementary Consumption
I find no evidence of the treatment affecting expenditures on other goods (Table 5.5).
Expenses on food outside of the household increased slightly by about Rs. 4 (columns 1
through 3), and reported expenditures on coffee and tea remained constant (columns 4
through 6; these may be underreported altogether). Of particular interest are expenses on
44
tobacco products as they are often thought of as complements to alcohol (Room (2004)).
However, there is no evidence of such effects (columns 7 through 9). This is not particular
surprising in the light of the facts that reported expenditures on tobacco and paan37
products are low to start with, and the incentives reduced overall alcohol expenditures only
moderately, hence limiting the scope of effects through complementarities in consumption.
1.5 Are Sobriety and Commitment Savings Substitutes?
The structure of the experiment allows for an additional test of the hypothesis that increasing
sobriety lowers self-control problems. The intuition for this test is straightforward. If self-
control problems prevent individuals from saving as much as they would like to, and if
commitment savings products help sophisticated individuals overcome these problems, then
commitment savings should have a larger effect for individuals with more severe self-control
problems. Hence, if alcohol reduces self-control, then increasing sobriety should lower the
effect of commitment savings. However, this intuition overlooks an additional, opposing
effect. While commitment savings products may help individuals overcome self-control
problems in future savings decisions by preventing them from withdrawing their savings
prematurely, the immediate decision to save always requires incurring instantaneous costs.
A sophisticated individual with severe self-control problems may not save (much) even if a
commitment savings product is offered, simply because he does not put much weight on
future consumption. In the extreme case, for β close to zero, the individual will not save
regardless of the availability of a commitment option.
This section shows a simple model that formalizes this intuition. I then consider a
specific case (isoelastic utility) to demonstrate two features of this model. First, the impact
of commitment savings is an inverse-U shaped function in present bias for sophisticated
individuals. The impact of commitment savings devices on savings is lowest for individuals
without present bias (β ≈ 1) and for the most present-biased individuals (β ≈ 0). At
37Paan is a mixture of ingredients including betel leaf, areca nut, and often tobacco. Chewing paan is popular
in many parts of India.
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least in theory, for individuals with the greatest need to overcome self-control problems,
commitment savings devices in the form in which they are often offered may only be
moderately helpful (if at all).38 Second, for the empirically relevant parameter range of
β > 0.5, an increase in β lowers the impact of commitment savings on savings. Accordingly,
a decrease in the impact of commitment savings due to increased sobriety, as demonstrated
in Section 1.5.2, can be viewed as evidence for increased self-control due to increased
sobriety.
1.5.1 A Simple Model
Consider a simple consumption-saving problem. A consumer lives for three periods. In
Period 1 he receives an endowment Y1. There are no other income sources in Periods 2
and 3, but the consumer is paid a matching contribution of M times the amount saved
by the start of Period 3. In Periods t = 1, 2, he has to decide how to allocate his available
resources into instantaneous consumption ct or savings. The instantaneous utility function
u(ct) is increasing and concave: u′(·) > 0 and u′′(·) < 0. The consumer has β-δ time
preferences as in Laibson (1997), with δ = 1 for simplicity and β ∈ (0, 1]. The individual
is sophisticated in the O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) sense. He understands the extent of
future self-control problems, i.e. he knows his future β. There is no uncertainty. In Period
1, he maximizes U1(c1, c2, c3) ≡ u(c1) + β[u(c2) + u(c3)] and in Period 2 he maximizes
U2(c2, c3) ≡ u(c2) + βu(c3).
No commitment savings. Consider first a situation without commitment savings. We solve
the problem recursively. In Period 3, the individual will consume the entire amount saved
plus the matching contribution: c3 = (Y1 − c1 − c2)(1 + M). In Period 2, the individual
38Note that interventions designed along the lines of the Save More Tomorrow program (Thaler and Benartzi
(2004)) overcome this problem, since it allows individuals to commit to saving more without reducing today’s
consumption.
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takes c1 as given and maximizes
max
c2
u(c2) + βu((Y1 − c1 − c2)(1+ M)) (1.1)
The associated FOC is u′(c2) = β(1+ M)u′((Y1− c1− c2)(1+ M)). This choice is anticipated
in Period 1 such that the individual chooses c1 to solve the following problem:
max
c1
u(c1) + β[u(c2) + u(c3)] (1.2)
s.t. c3 = (Y1 − c1 − c2)(1+ M) (1.3)
u′(c2) = β(1+ M)u′(c3) (1.4)
c1, c2, c3 ≥ 0 (1.5)
Defining Y2 ≡ Y1 − c1, the solution is described by the following three equations.
u′(c1) = β
[
u′(c2)
dc2
dY2
+ u′(c3)
dc3
dY2
]
(1.6)
u′(c2) = β(1+ M)u′(c3) (1.7)
c3 = (Y2 − c2)(1+ M) (1.8)
Combining these equations yields a version of the familiar modified Euler equation (Harris
and Laibson (2001)):39
u′(c1) =
[
β
dc2
dY2
+
(
1− dc2
dY2
)]
u′(c2) (1.9)
Commitment savings. Consider now the situation in which a commitment savings account
is available. That is, any money that is saved in Period 1 cannot be withdrawn until Period
3. Period 1 self would like to set u′(c2) = (1 + M)u′(c3). However, in the absence of
commitment savings, Period 2 self deviates from this, i.e. chooses c2 such that u′(c2) =
β(1+ M)u′(c3) and, hence, consumes more than the Period 1 self would like him to. This
creates a demand for commitment for Period 1 self. Since the Period 1 self is always
39In contrast to Harris and Laibson (2001), there is no interest rate in this equation since M is a matching
contribution rather than an interest rate.
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(weakly) more patient than the Period 2 self, this implies that the solution to this problem
is simply the case in which the Period 1 self determines consumption in all three periods.
The individual will consume c1 and deposit c3 into the commitment savings account such
that u′(c1) = βu′(c2) = β(1+ M)u′(c3), subject to the above budget constraint. Hence, the
solution is described by the following equations:
u′(c1) = βu′(c2) (1.10)
u′(c2) = (1+ M)u′(c3) (1.11)
c3 = (Y2 − c2)(1+ M) (1.12)
Comparing the two above solutions clarifies the relationship between present bias
and commitment savings. Introducing a commitment savings option increases savings
iff 0 < β < 1, since the commitment savings device makes both the Period 1 and 2
selves consume a smaller share of their available resources Y1 and Y2, respectively. If β = 1,
commitment savings has no effect as there is no discrepancy between the Period 1 and Period
2 preferences. At the other extreme, if β→ 0, there are no savings even if commitment is
available such that there is no impact of the commitment device on savings choices either.40
Taken together, this implies that the impact of commitment savings is non-monotonic in
present bias.
For β ∈ (0, 1), changing β has two opposing effects on the impact of commitment on
savings. The first effect is that, in the absence of commitment, the Period 2 self will deviate
more from the allocation that maximizes Period 1 self’s utility (by increasing c2 relative to c3).
This not only reduces Period 2 self’s savings for given resources, but it also reduces Period
1 self’s saving as he anticipates this effect. In contrast, in the presence of the commitment
device, the Period 1 self can prevent this from happening by saving the desired amount
using the commitment device. Hence, the impact of the commitment device on savings is
larger for increased present bias due to this effect. However, there is a second, opposing
effect. Since Period 1 self’s β also decreases, the desire to allocate resources to Periods 2 and
40Subsistence levels in consumption could change this in the absence of income sources in Periods 2 and 3.
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3 falls even if a commitment savings option is available. This lowers the impact of offering
the commitment savings option. In the extreme case for β→ 0, there is no effect.
Solving for the isoelastic case. Consider the case of the commonly used isoelastic utility
function.
u(ct) =

c1−γt
1−γ if γ 6= 1,
log(ct) if γ = 1.
(1.13)
The impact of commitment savings on savings is given by the difference in consumption
levels in period 3 with and without commitment (see Appendix Section 5.2.1 for details).
∆ ≡ cC3 − cNC3 =
Y(1+ M)
1+ θ + θ
[
1+βθ
1+θ
]−1
γ
− Y(1+ M)
1+ θ + (1+ M)1−
1
γ
. (1.14)
Figure 1.5 depicts ∆ as a function of β for different values of γ. For the empirically
relevant ranges of β ∈ [0.5, 1] and γ > 0.5, a decrease in present bias, i.e. an increase in β,
lowers the impact of commitment savings devices on savings.41 This implies that an increase
in sobriety (which lowers the use of commitment savings in my experiment) is effectively
equivalent to an increase in β.
1.5.2 Empirical Evidence
In my study, increasing sobriety and commitment savings are substitutes in terms of their
impact on savings. Figure 1.6 shows cumulative savings by the (pooled) sobriety treatment
and the cross-randomized savings conditions.42 In the upper panel of the figure, individuals
are divided into four groups according to whether they were offered sobriety incentives—
41See, for instance, Frederick et al. (2002) for a review of estimates of present bias, and Chetty (2006) for
estimates of γ.
42The two sobriety treatments are pooled solely for expositional purposes. The equivalent graphs without
pooling the sobriety treatment groups show only very minor differences in savings behavior between the
Incentive and Choice Groups (Figure 5.6).
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Notes: This figure shows the relationship between present bias and the effect of commitment savings in the
model described in Sections 1.5.1 and 5.2.1.
1. The figure shows the present bias (as measured by β ∈ [0, 1]) on the horizontal axis and the increase in
savings due to offering a commitment savings option on the vertical axis for the isoelastic utility case.
2. This increase in savings is given by the difference in consumption in period 3 between the two cases described
in my model, i.e. ∆ = cC3 − cNC3 as shown in equation (1.14).
3. The figure depicts the relationship between ∆ and β for γ = 0.5 (the solid line), γ = 1 (the dotted line), and
γ = 2 (dashed line).
4. In the specific figure shown here, Y = 1 and M = 0.2. The relationship is very similar, if not identical, for
different parameter values. An explicit solution for ∆ in the log case (γ = 1) is given in the Supplementary
Appendix below.
Figure 1.5: Effect of Commitment Savings as Function of β
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pooling the Incentive and Choice Groups—and whether their savings option included the
cross-randomized Commitment Savings feature.43 Cumulative savings for the four groups
are nearly identical through the pre-incentive period until day 4, and throughout the study,
three of the four lines in the graph remain nearly indistinguishable. However, the group that
received neither commitment savings nor the alcohol treatment (as represented by the green
line with solid circles) saved much less than each of the remaining groups subsequently.
While both incentives for sobriety and the commitment savings option have a large impact
on savings, being assigned to both does not further increase savings.
These differences across treatment groups are due to differences in both deposits and
withdrawals (Figure 1.7). Compared to the group without either incentives for sobriety
or commitment savings, sobriety incentives and commitment savings each on their own
increased deposits (upper panel), and reduced withdrawals (lower panel). The magnitudes
of these effects vary slightly. The effect of sobriety incentives on deposits is somewhat
larger than the effect of commitment savings, but this difference is offset by an equivalent
difference in withdrawals resulting in nearly identical overall savings.
These results suggest that increasing sobriety reduced self-control problems. An alterna-
tive interpretation could be that alcohol is a key temptation good for this population such
that reducing alcohol consumption mitigates the need for commitment savings. However,
given that the intervention only moderately reduced overall alcohol consumption and
expenditures, this channel is unlikely.
A second competing explanation could be that there was an upper bound of how much
individuals were able to or wanted to save. However, average daily savings are well below
the savings limit of Rs. 200 per day. Moreover, in the course of the study, all individuals
received relatively large study payments in addition to their earnings outside of the study,
which appear to have been largely unaffected by the study. This suggests that the majority
of individuals would have been able to increase their savings if they had preferred to
43For instance, the blue line with squares shows cumulative savings for individuals who were not offered
incentives for sobriety, but who were given the commitment savings options.
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Figure 1.6: Interaction between Sobriety Incentives and Savings Treatments
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do so. Consistent with this, increasing the matching contribution rate did not serve as
a complement to increased sobriety, i.e. the effects of incentives for sobriety and a high
matching contribution appear to have been additive (lower panel of Figure 1.6).
Table 1.11: Interaction between Sobriety Incentives and Savings Treatments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Rs/day Rs/day Rs/day Rs/day
Either Incentives or Commitment Savings 19.77** 15.48*
(9.037) (8.679)
Sobriety Incentives only 0.49 0.06
(9.745) (9.048)
Both Incentives and Commitment Savings 1.43 2.36
(9.562) (9.997)
Either Incentives or High Matching Contribution 12.43 12.23
(8.841) (9.489)
Sobriety Incentives only 2.42 0.15
(8.957) (9.851)
Both Incentives and High Matching Contribution 10.16 8.30
(9.468) (9.731)
Observations 3,435 3,435 3,435 3,435
R-squared 0.006 0.037 0.005 0.037
Baseline survey controls NO YES NO YES
Phase 1 controls NO NO NO NO
Control mean 20.42 20.42 20.42 20.42
Notes: This table shows estimates of the impact of lottery winnings on the amounts saved at the study office.
1. All regressions use data from day 5 (the first day of sobriety incentives) through day 19 (the last day of
sobriety incentives) of the study. The outcome variable is the amount saved at the study office. If an
individual did not visit the study office on any given day of the study, the amount saved is set to zero on
this day. Similarly, the daily study payment is zero for those observations.
2. Columns (1) and (2) show the relationship between the effects of offering sobriety incentives and commitment
savings. Columns (3) and (4) show the relationship between the effects of offering sobriety incentives and a
high matching contribution.
3. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by individual. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent level, respectively. Baseline survey controls are the same as in the above tables.
1.6 Do Individuals Want to Reduce Their Drinking?
Given the above short-term costs and other longer-run costs of alcohol consumption, a
natural question to ask is whether individuals are aware of the costs of alcohol consumption.
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In particular, if these costs exceed the benefits of drinking, why are individuals not reduc-
ing their consumption? This section considers the extent to which self-control problems
contribute to individuals’ demand for receiving incentives for sobriety. After receiving
incentives for three days, individuals in the Choice Group were asked to choose between
incentives to arrive sober and different amounts of unconditional payments. Individuals
in the Choice Group first made these choices at the beginning of Phase 3 (day 7), and then
again at the beginning of Phase 4 (day 13). Finally, regardless of experimental condition,
all study participants were given the same choices at the end of Phase 4 (day 20). This
structure allows me to investigate whether individuals in the Choice Group changed their
choices over time, and whether receiving incentives in earlier phases of the study affected
individuals’ demand for commitment. During each choice session, individuals chose their
incentive structure for the subsequent six study days.44
The demand for incentives was high, even when choosing incentives entailed a potential
(Choice 2) or certain (Choice 3) reduction in overall study payments (upper panel of Figure
1.8 and Table 5.7). More than one third of individuals in the Choice Group preferred
sobriety incentives over receiving Rs. 150 regardless of their breathalyzer scores, and in each
week, over 50 percent of individuals chose incentives over receiving Rs. 120 unconditionally.
Holding attendance constant, this choice implied losses of Rs. 30 ($0.50) in study payments
at the minimum (on days when the individual visits the study office sober) and Rs. 90 ($1.50)
at the maximum (on days when the individual visits the study with a positive breathalyzer
score). These amounts are economically meaningful, representing between 10 and 30 percent
of reported daily labor earnings. Moreover, the fraction of individuals choosing sobriety
44Attrition and inconsistencies of preferences during the choice session cause relatively minor concerns for
the below analysis (Table 5.6). In the Choice Group, less than 7 percent of individuals missed their choices in any
given week, and, in each week, less than 7 percent of individuals stated inconsistent preferences. Furthermore,
over 88 percent of all study participants completed the endline choices with consistent choices. This fraction
varies only slightly across treatment groups (90.1 in the Incentive Group and 88.0 in the Choice Group vs. 86.7
in the Control Group). In an attempt to be conservative regarding the demand for commitment in Figure 1.8
and Table 5.7, an individual is counted as not choosing incentives in any given choice when he did not attend
the respective choice session or when he attended, but made inconsistent choices. The below regressions in
Tables 1.12 and 1.13 are conditional on attendance. The analysis is robust to alternative specifications.
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Figure 1.8: Choices Across Treatment Groups and Over Time
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incentives over Rs. 150 unconditionally did not decline over time. Instead, though not
statistically significant, it in fact increased slightly over the course of the study.
Subjects’ choices provide clear evidence of self-control problems. In particular, the
fraction of individuals who exhibited costly demand for commitment was larger than found
previously for smoking (Gine et al. (2010)) or exercising (Royer et al. (2014)). A growing
literature has demonstrated demand for commitment in a number of domains.45 However,
with the exceptions of Beshears et al. (2011) and Milkman et al. (2014), there is little existing
evidence that individuals are willing to pay for commitment beyond the potential costs
of failing to achieve the behavior they are committing to.46 In my study, about a third of
subjects made choices that implied significant losses in study payments even in the best
case of visiting the study office sober every day.
Moreover, Table 1.12 shows the relationship between the number of sober days in each
phase of the study and the demand for sobriety incentives. Individuals who visited the
study office sober more often in the incentivized Phase 2 were subsequently more likely to
choose incentives for all three unconditional amounts. This is not surprising since expected
study payments from choosing incentives were higher if a study participant was more likely
to visit the study office sober. In contrast, the difference in sobriety between Phase 2 (when
some individuals were receiving incentives) and Phase 1 (the pre-incentive period) positively
predicts demand only for costly incentives (i.e. when the unconditional payment is Rs. 150).
This is reassuring since individuals should have chosen costly incentives only when they
45For instance, Ashraf et al. (2006) and Beshears et al. (2011) on commitment savings; Gine et al. (2010) on
smoking cessation; Kaur et al. (2014) on self-control at the workplace; Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002), Augenblick
et al. (2014), and Houser et al. (2010) on effort tasks; and Royer et al. (2014) and Milkman et al. (2014) for gym
attendance. See Bryan et al. (2010) and Augenblick et al. (2014) for overviews.
46A large number of studies in the psychology literature have associated excessive alcohol consumption with
survey measures of (lack of) self-control, behavioral undercontrol, and susceptibility to temptation (Hull and
Slone (2004)). In addition, the existence of and demand for disulfiram (Antabuse) can be viewed as evidence
of self-control problems causing alcohol consumption (Glazer and Weiss (2007), Bryan et al. (2010)). However,
evaluations of disulfiram treatment for alcohol dependence have shown inconsistent findings, in a large part
because of low treatment adherence as in Fuller et al. (1986). Studies evaluating incentives to increase compliance
(O’Farrell et al. (1995)) and a combination of disulfiram with other medication to reduce cravings or withdrawal
symptoms such as naltrexone or acamprosate have found more promising results (Suh et al. (2006)), but do not
necessarily show evidence of demand for commitment and, hence, self-control problems.
57
expected them to help increase their sobriety, which in turn should have been informed by
their own experience in the study.
Exposure to incentives for sobriety increased the demand for the incentives (lower panel
of Figure 1.8). For all three choices, the Incentive Groups were more likely to choose
incentives than the Control Group. The fraction of individuals choosing incentives in the
Choice Groups (on day 20) was in between the corresponding fractions in the Incentive
and Control Groups. The corresponding regressions show significant differences between
the fraction choosing incentives in the Incentive and Control Groups for all three choices
(Table 1.13). These differences are not explained by differences in sobriety while making
these choices, or by differences in expectations of future sobriety under incentives. Before
preferences were elicited, individuals were asked how often they expected to visit the study
office sober if they were to be given incentives for sobriety. Reassuringly, subjects’ beliefs
about their expected sobriety under incentives strongly predicts demand for incentives.
Finally, higher sobriety during the time of choosing predicts a higher probability of choosing
incentives.
The above findings raise the question why so many study participants exhibited the
demand for commitment despite the fact that overall drinking only fell moderately. Several,
not mutually exclusive explanations are possible. First, the above estimates suggest that
incentives for sobriety caused several small benefits, which taken together may well exceed
Rs. 30. On average, though not statistically significant, sobriety incentives increased reported
earnings by about Rs. 17.6), and reduced reported alcohol expenditures by about Rs. 8.7.
Moreover, as shown above, savings increased significantly. Increasing sobriety may have
also improved other decisions, and individuals may have valued daytime sobriety on its
own despite potentially increased disutility of work due to increased physical pain.
Second, partial naïveté may have contributed to the demand for commitment. On the one
hand, underestimating the extent of their self-control problems due to partial or full naïveté
as in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) may lower the demand for (costly) commitment by
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decreasing the perceived benefits of commitment (Laibson (2015)). On the other hand, partial
naïveté can also increase the demand for commitment by causing individuals to overestimate
the effectiveness of commitment devices in overcoming their self-control problems.47 In the
context of my study, while being aware of their own self-control problems, some individuals
may have overestimated the usefulness of the incentives for sobriety in reducing their
daytime or overall drinking.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that self-control problems may not only cause undesired
alcohol consumption, but that alcohol itself exacerbates present bias, and hence creates
further self-control problems in other domains. Increasing sobriety during the day causes
a stark increase in individuals’ savings at the study office. I provide evidence that this
increase was not just the result of mechanical effects from increased resources, but due to
lowered self-control problems in savings decisions as a consequence of decreased myopia.
Taken together, these results imply that effective commitment devices for sobriety not
only help individuals reduce undesired alcohol consumption, but also lessen self-control
problems caused by alcohol. More generally, the results suggest that alcohol changes
decision processes in a way that may reinforce poverty.
A significant fraction of cycle-rickshaw peddlers in a large Indian city were willing to
sacrifice money for commitment to increase sobriety during the day, indicating a greater
awareness of and willingness to overcome self-control problems than found in most other
settings. This high prevalence of self-control problems suggests that “sin taxes" could be an
attractive policy option (Gruber and Ko˝szegi (2001), O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006)). Given
the negative correlation of alcohol consumption and income, such taxes may be regressive.
However, the regressiveness of taxation may be mitigated if consumers have self-control
problems. Gruber and Ko˝szegi (2004) show that “sin taxes" can even be progressive (in
47For a more detailed treatment of this argument and an application in the savings domain, see John (2014).
61
particular in the utility domain) if poor individuals are more price-elastic and/or are more
present-biased compared to rich individuals. The results from this study suggest that the
regressiveness of taxing alcohol may be further lessened due to effects of reduced drinking
on earnings and savings. However, given that the price elasticity of the demand for alcohol
in this setting is below unity, increasing taxes would further reduce individuals’ – and
therefore many families’ – already low income net of alcohol expenditures, unless the effects
of reduced drinking on earnings turn out to be particularly large.48
A second, more extreme policy option could be prohibition, as already implemented
in several Indian states such as Gujarat. Prohibition may be a particularly attractive
policy option for India and other developing countries compared to developed countries
since the distribution of alcohol consumption is heavily skewed, with the majority of
the population abstaining from alcohol and a relatively large share among the drinkers
consuming alcohol excessively. However, enforcement of prohibition is known to be difficult
and may result in other unintended consequences such as crime and corruption (Thornton
(1991)). Moreover, many Indian state governments heavily depend on excise taxes, which
makes the implementation of prohibition difficult. Given these concerns, second-best policies
aimed at reducing the costs of inebriation by shifting critical decision away from drinking
times could be welfare-improving even if they do not change overall drinking levels.
48In most other studies, the price elasticity of alcohol consumption has been found to be below unity, and
heavy drinkers’ price response tends to be particularly small Manning et al. (1995). For an overview, see
Wagenaar et al. (2009).
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Chapter 2
Technology Diffusion and
Appropriate Use: Evidence from
Western Kenya1
2.1 Introduction
Low technology adoption has hampered growth in agricultural productivity in Sub-Saharan
Africa (Bank (2008), Evenson and Gollin (2003)). Insufficient knowledge of appropriate
use may inhibit technology diffusion since information regarding appropriate use of often
risky new technologies is scarce in many contexts. In the absence of reliable sources of
information, sharing experiences and learning from each other can be important ways to
increase knowledge for small-scale farmers.2 If input decisions are unobserved, the ability
and willingness of farmers to communicate with each other become crucial aspects of
knowledge diffusion. However, lack of ability or willingness to communicate among small-
scale farmers may curb knowledge diffusion and, hence, technology adoption (BenYishay
1Co-authored with Esther Duflo, Michael Kremer, and Jon Robinson
2See, for example, Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Munshi (2004), Bandiera and Rasul (2006), Conley and
Udry (2010); see Foster and Rosenzweig (2010) for a review.
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and Mobarak (2014)).
Using evidence from a field experiment with over 30,000 small-scale maize farmers,
this paper considers the impact of introducing a simple measurement tool for fertilizer on
knowledge diffusion and fertilizer use in Western Kenya. In the experiment, we randomly
selected 15% of farmers to receive a “Bluespoon", a small measuring spoons painted blue.
These spoons measure the physical quantity of one-half teaspoon, which was found to
result in the highest profits on average among four different options in earlier work (Duflo
et al. (2008)). The Bluespoons could be used to apply fertilizer to maize and they were
also made available in local shops. Since the spoons were commercially unavailable before
our project, we identify spillovers by examining whether the other 85% of farmers not
offered spoons learned about or purchased them. Moreover, the experiment included two
cross-randomized school-level treatment conditions. First, we attempted to reduce the cost
of sharing information by encouraging farmers to form cooperatives. While we helped
organizing the groups and coordinated the first few meetings, no information was provided
directly. Second, motivated by previous work (Duflo et al. (2011)), we provided farmers with
small, time-limited discounts, valid within a short window right after harvest, redeemable
at a fertilizer shop in local market centers. This treatment condition was supplemented by
text message reminders for a randomized subsample of farmers.
The main results of our paper concern the diffusion of Bluespoons and knowledge
among farmers. First, as predicted by a target input model as in Jovanovic and Nyarko
(1996), being assigned to receive a Bluespoon significantly increases fertilizer use among
farmers, as measured by administrative data on discount coupon redemption and self-
reported fertilizer use by farmers. Second, we consider the diffusion of Bluespoons through
social networks. Bluespoons were extremely popular among farmers: about one year after
their introduction, 59% of farmers had heard of the Bluespoon, and 23% owned one, which
is a remarkable level of diffusion, given that the Bluespoons had not been not previously
available to farmers before the experiment. We relate the diffusion of Bluespoons to two
treatment conditions. Contacts of Bluespoon farmers were 14 percentage points more likely
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to have heard of the Bluespoon and 7 percentage points more likely to own one. Moreover,
individuals in cooperative schools were 7 percentage points more likely to own a Bluespoon.
Third, the diffusion of Bluespoons was paralleled by diffusion of knowledge. Farmers
who were assigned to receive a Bluespoon are significantly more likely to identify one-half
teaspoon – the quantity measured by a Bluespoon – as the optimal quantity of fertilizer
to be used per planting hole. Finally, while we also find some evidence that the diffusion
of knowledge and Bluespoon is increased by the coupon intervention, we do not find any
evidence of the diffusion of fertilizer adoption through social networks. In preliminary
results, none of the different treatment conditions affected fertilizer use among contacts of
farmers who participated in the program.
The paper also provides evidence on the impact of a large-scale discount coupon
intervention on fertilizer use. The time-limited discount around harvest time increased
reported fertilizer use by 9 to 13 percentage points (on a base of about 50%). These results
suggest that, given the low fiscal costs and potentially lower distortions associated with
small, time-limited discounts, such discounts may be an attractive policy alternative to
larger subsidies at the time of planting for governments intending to increase fertilizer use
on a broad scale. While small discounts have a more muted effect on adoption than larger
subsidies, they are clearly much less expensive. Our results on text message reminders
supplementing such a program are mixed. On the one hand, the text message reminders
significantly increased fertilizer coupon redemption, as others have found in regards to
ARV adherence (Lester et al. (2010)) and savings (Karlan et al. (2014a)). However, on the
other hand, we do not find evidence of the text message reminders increasing fertilizer use,
suggesting that the reminders only had an impact on coupon redemption of infra-marginal
farmers, i.e. the reminders increased coupon redemption among individuals who would
have used fertilizer anyway.
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows. First, Section 2.2 describes
the experimental design and data. Section 2.3 then describes the impact of the different
treatment conditions on fertilizer use. Section 2.4 considers the impact of the different
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treatments on Bluespoon and knowledge diffusion. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Experimental Design and Data
2.2.1 Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted with small-scale farmers over two agricultural seasons (short
rains 2010 and long rains 2011).3 To reach a high number of farmers at affordable costs,
we leveraged a large social network: the parents of school children in 184 rural primary
schools in Western Kenya. Children in these schools were given a letter inviting their parents
inviting them to a meeting at the school. Every parent who participated in a meeting at a
particular school was eligible for the treatment administered at this school. At the meeting,
the experimental treatments (if any) were explained, and enumerators completed a short
baseline survey with each participant. We enrolled 26,856 farmers (on average about 146
farmers per school) into the program, whom we refer to as “original respondents" below.
Coupons, Cooperatives, and SMS Reminders. We cross-randomized farmers at the school
level into two main treatment conditions. First, to lower costs of communicating and sharing
knowledge about fertilizer and other agricultural practices, we encouraged farmers to form
farmers’ cooperatives to talk about agriculture. While we facilitated organizing the groups
and coordinated the first few meetings, we did not provide any information directly to
farmers. Second, in previous work, we find that providing farmers with small incentives
to invest in fertilizer when they have money (right after harvest) can substantially increase
usage (Duflo et al. (2011)). Hence, to increase usage exogenously, we implemented a scalable
version of a program to provide farmers with small, time-limited discounts which were
valid within a short window (3 to 4 weeks) right after harvest, redeemable at a local shop.
Farmers received coupons for a discount of 15% of the price of fertilizer. The coupon was
3In our study area, there are two agricultural seasons for growing maize each ear: the“long rains” from
March/April to July/August, and the “short rains” from July/August until December/January.
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valid for discounts to either diammonium phosphate fertilizer (DAP), used at planting,
and calcium ammonium nitrate fertilizer (CAN), used at top dressing, when the maize
plant is knee high, approximately one to two months after planting. Farmers could choose
any combination of DAP and CAN up to 25 kilograms in total. Moreover, to evaluate
the effectiveness of text message reminders, we randomly selected half of the schools that
received fertilizer discount coupons into a text message reminder program. In these schools,
we randomized a subset of individuals who either owned a cellphone or had access to a
cellphone to receive a text message reminder two days before the expiration date of their
time-limited discount. We conducted a distinct individual- and school-level randomization
of text message reminders in the second season, i.e. individuals who received a text message
reminder in the first season did not necessarily receive one in the second season as well.
This allows us to also consider the effect of receiving a text message reminder on coupon
redemption and fertilizer use in the consecutive season.
Social Networks and Bluespoons. Due to staff and time constraints at the school meetings,
we restricted the collection of social network information to a randomly selected subset
of individuals. At each school meeting, we asked about 25% of farmers in each school to
provide names and contact information of up to 3 individuals outside their own household
with whom they discussed agriculture whom we refer to as “agricultural contacts" below.
About two thirds of these individuals were randomly selected to receive a "Bluespoon," a
half-teaspoon, painted blue, which farmers could use to apply fertilizer to their maize. We
chose this simple technology because in earlier work we had found 1/2 teaspoon of CAN to
yield the highest profits on average among four different quantities (Duflo et al. (2008)). We
delivered these spoons in an additional short meeting (at the same schools) to which we
had invited the randomly selected subset of farmers. In addition, farmers were given the
information that in earlier work we had found that this quantity of CAN resulted in the
highest profits on average. Again due to logistical constraints, the timing of these meetings
was randomized. One third of individuals who were randomized to receive a Bluespoon
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(group 1) was visited about one week after the large school meeting, one third (group 2)
was visited about three weeks after the meeting, and the remaining individuals (group 3)
were visited about six weeks after the meeting. Bluespoons were also made available to
anyone for a nominal fee ($0.05) in the local market center at the same shops which handled
the coupon redemption.
Tracking Bluespoon and Knowledge Diffusion. The diffusion of Bluespoons and knowl-
edge in social networks is a key outcome of this paper, which we measured in several ways.
First, farmers who received a Bluespoon were also given 10 vouchers for Bluespoons along
with an encouragement to share them with their friends. The vouchers did not entitle farm-
ers to purchase spoons at a discounted price or for free, i.e. there was no financial incentive
to use the vouchers. However, we asked farmers to encourage their friends to use these
vouchers when purchasing spoons. Individual-specific identifiers printed on all vouchers
allow us to trace Bluespoon diffusion. Second, we administered a short survey at endline
(similar to the baseline survey) to which we invited all farmers who had been surveyed at
baseline. In addition, we invited one randomly selected agricultural contact of all farmers
who had provided us with information of at least one individual (as described above). In
this short endline survey, we asked all individuals about fertilizer use, knowledge and
ownership of Bluespoons, as well as their belief regarding the optimal quantity of fertilizer
per planting hole. Third, we conducted in-depth endline surveys with a randomly selected
subset of original respondents and agricultural contacts. In each school, we randomly
selected 16 individuals among all respondents who had been asked about their agricultural
contacts during the baseline survey. The sample was chosen such that half of these 16
individuals had been selected to receive a Bluespoon, and, accordingly, the other half had
been not been selected to receive a Bluespoon. Furthermore, for each of the 16 selected
individuals from each school, we again selected one of their randomly selected contact (if
available) to be visited as well for the in-depth endline survey.
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2.2.2 Data
Our analysis uses four main sources of data.
Short Baseline Surveys. First, we conducted short baseline surveys during school meetings.
These surveys elicited information on previous use of CAN and DAP, as well as on fertilizer
quantities and the application method used. In addition, we asked respondents how much
of each of the two types of fertilizer they thought should be used per maize planting hole.
To get an objective measure of these quantities, subjects were asked to pick one of four
small containers that contained different amounts of fertilizer, one of which contained half
a teaspoon of fertilizer. In addition, we asked a randomly selected subsample for contact
information of up to three individuals outside their household with whom they discussed
agriculture on a regular basis.
Short Endline Surveys. Second, we conducted similarly short follow-up surveys at endline
school meetings, including the same questions as at baseline, plus a verbal measure of
optimal qualities per planting hole. In addition to usage and quantities, endline surveys
also included questions on group membership, as well as Bluespoon knowledge, usage, and
ownership.
Long Endline Surveys. Third, to get more detail on fertilizer use and communication
among farmers, we conducted a longer one-on-one survey with a randomly selected subset
of respondents at their homes. This survey included several demographic questions, as well
as more detailed questions on fertilizer and Bluespoon usage and knowledge. The survey
also included a number of questions to measure social interactions.
Administrative Redemption Data. Fourth, we collected administrative data on fertilizer
coupon redemption as well as Bluespoon voucher redemption and sales at local fertilizer
shops.
69
2.2.3 Summary Statistics, Randomization, and Attrition
In an effort to reach as many farmers as possible during the school meetings, we kept the
baseline survey conducted at these meetings as short as possible. Hence, only a few baseline
measures other than prior usage of fertilizer are available for balance checks. We collected
additional covariates during the endline, but since these surveys were conducted after
the program had been implemented, potential endogeneity concerns arise. We therefore
look at outcomes which are unlikely to be affected by the program, namely household
demographics.
We check for orthogonality of treatments by running the following regression for each
background characteristic yi:
yi = β0 + T′i β+ ε i (2.1)
where Ti is the set of treatment indicators for individual i. At the school level, the treatment
conditions are whether the school was sampled for the coupon and cooperative treatments,
and whether the school was sampled to receive SMS reminders (to redeem their fertilizer
coupon). We also include an interaction between the two school-level treatments to check for
potential interaction effects. At the individual level, the treatments are receiving a Bluespoon
and being sampled to receive an SMS reminder. Since only farmers with a cell phone or
access to a cell phone could receive an SMS (which, from Table 2.1, makes up 54% of the
sample) we also include a control for eligibility to the SMS treatment (coefficients omitted).
Randomization Checks. Table 2.1 shows basic summary statistics and randomization
checks for the study sample. The regression results shown in this table reveal little evidence
of imbalance across treatment groups. Columns 1 through 5 show sample characteristics
based on the large baseline school meetings. Importantly, prior fertilizer usage is similar
across all treatment groups (columns 1 through 3). There are slight imbalances in reported
qualities of fertilizer to be used per planting hole (column 4) and phone availability (column
5). Whenever possible, we control for these variables in our analyses below. The remaining
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columns (6 through 11) are based on the in-depth endline surveys at respondents’ homes.
While there are a few variables which differ significantly across treatments, these differences
seem likely due to chance.
Attrition patterns. We also check for differential attrition patterns in Table 2.2. We find that
farmers in cooperative-only schools are less likely to be in the school endline and Bluespoon
farmers are more likely to be in the school endline. However, we find no evidence of
differential attrition in the home endline. We also find no evidence of attrition among
sampled contacts, other than that the friends of farmers who received SMS reminders are
more likely to be in the sample, a result which is likely due to chance given the limited
overall effect of that program.
2.3 Fertilizer Use
This section considers the impact of the different treatments on fertilizer use. Section 2.3.1
first presents results based on administrative data (coupon redemption) before Section 2.3.2
considers self-reported fertilizer use based on short and long endline surveys.
2.3.1 Fertilizer Coupon Redemption
Overall coupon redemption, summarized in Table 2.3, was relatively low: 18% and 12%
of farmers redeemed their discount coupons in season 1 (short rains 2010) and season 2
(long rains 2011), respectively. The fraction of farmers taking advantage of the program
is significantly lower than in Duflo et al. (2011), in which take-up was between 31 and 39
percent in the two seasons, respectively. On the one hand, it is still a substantial fraction
given that the subsidy is small (15% of the price of fertilizer), and that farmers had to
redeem the coupon at a local shop rather than at their homes, e.g. leaving room for the
possibility of individuals forgetting about the redemption period. Moreover, while the
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Table 2.2: Attrition
In short endline In long endline
(1) (2) (3)
Coupon School -0.02 0.01 -0.00
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021)
Cooperative School -0.04** 0.01 0.00
(0.020) (0.013) (0.019)
Coupon Coop Interaction 0.04* -0.02 0.01
(0.025) (0.019) (0.027)
Individual selected to receive a Bluespoon 0.03*** 0.00 0.00
(0.009) (0.008) (0.013)
School sampled to receive SMS -0.03* 0.01 -0.02
(0.017) (0.015) (0.018)
Individual sampled to receive SMS 0.02* 0.01 0.06**
(0.012) (0.022) (0.024)
Observations 26,856 2,914 2,681
R-squared 0.004 0.001 0.002
Overall mean 0.828 0.938 0.863
Control mean 0.848 0.933 0.874
Notes: This table shows attrition patterns in the study.
(1) The outcome variable in columns 1 and 2 is whether we were able to conduct
a short endline with an individual (among everyone surveyed at baseline).
The outcome variable in columns 3 is whether we were able to conduct
a long endline survey with an agricultural contact named by the original
respondents (among everyone sampled for the long endline survey).
(2) The independent variables in columns 5 and 6 correspond to the original
respondent who named the particular friend during the baseline meeting.
(3) Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by school. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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previous intervention entailed a personal explanation of the program to each farmer at
his or her home, the current intervention was conducted in large public meetings with
almost 150 farmers on average, such that it is possible that a fraction of farmers may not
have fully understood all details of the coupon program. On the other hand, given that
over half of the respondents individuals reported fertilizer use in each of the seasons, the
relatively low coupon redemption rate is puzzling, especially since liquidity constraints
are an unlikely explanation due to the timing of the intervention.4 Finally, most coupons
were used to purchase DAP (planting) fertilizer, and, as in previous work, the quantities
purchased conditional on making use of the program were small. In each season, farmers
who redeemed their coupon purchased about 9 kgs of fertilizer with their coupon.5
Table 2.4 examines the effect of the different treatment conditions on fertilizer use, as
measured by coupon redemption. It includes regressions similar to Tables 2.1 and 2.2,
though restricted to coupon schools only. The outcome variable in the first five columns
is whether a particular individual redeemed their coupon; the outcome variable in the
remaining five columns is the (unconditional) quantity redeemed using the coupon (if any).
In each half of the table, the first two columns consider season 1, and the remaining three
columns consider season 2. The table shows three sets of results.
First, we do not find evidence that the cross-randomized school-level treatments affected
coupon redemption. None of the 20 coefficients in the entire table show statistically
significant effects of the cooperative or school-level text message treatments. This is not
particularly surprising given that one would expect the effect of the cooperative treatment
to come with some lag, and – given the estimated effect size of text message reminders at
4Similarly to our study, Carter et al. (2013) found low coupon redemption rates in a recently completed
randomized evaluation with maize farmers in Mozambique. In this intervention, despite a 73% subsidy (worth
USD 117) and demanding eligibility criteria (access to agricultural extension, ability to pay USD 32, being a
“progressive farmer" and land size between 0.5 and 5 hectares), coupon redemption for a package of improved
seeds and fertilizer was only 16% higher in the treatment compared to the control group (22% vs. 6%).
5The distribution of redeemed quantities was also highly skewed. In season 1, the median farmer who
redeemed her coupon purchased 4 kgs of DAP and only ten percent of farmers bought at least 5 kgs of CAN
conditional on redeeming the coupon. Given that using half a teaspoon on a one acre plot requires about 50 kgs
of fertilizer, these quantities are relatively small.
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Table 2.3: Fertilizer Coupon Redemption
Season 1 Season 2
(SR 10) (LR 11)
Fraction of individuals who redeemed their coupon
Percentage of coupons redeemed 0.18 0.12
(0.38) (0.32)
Percentage of coupons redeemed for DAP 0.15 0.10
(0.36) (0.30)
Percentage of coupons redeemed for CAN 0.06 0.04
(0.24) (0.21)
Quantities purchased using coupons
Quantity purchased (unconditional) 1.62 1.10
(4.86) (4.37)
Quantity purchased (conditional on redeeming) 9.00 9.19
(8.08) (9.27)
Quantity DAP purchased (conditional on redeeming) 7.40 7.23
(7.77) (8.40)
Quantity CAN purchase (conditional on redeeming) 1.60 1.96
(3.93) (4.47)
Total number of coupons 9,505 7,902
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for fertilizer coupon redemption in the two
seasons of the program. Standard errors are in parentheses.
1. Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by school. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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the individual level – statistical power to detect effects at the school level was low.
Second, receiving a text message increased the probability of a farmer redeeming her
coupon by approximately 3 and 6 percentage points in the two seasons at the individual
level, respectively (columns 1 through 5). The stronger individual-level effect in season 2
may be due to differences in the nature of the text message intervention. In season 1, we
sent text messages to everyone who provided us with a phone number, while in season 2
we sent messages only to respondents who gave us a phone number and who indicated
that a household member was the owner of the phone (information that we did not collect
in season 1). Moreover, we find a small positive effect of text messages sent in the first
season on coupon redemption in the schools visited in both seasons (columns 4 and 5).
While the estimated effects of text message reminders are modest in absolute terms, they are
large in relative terms (18 percent and 50 percent, respectively), and, conditional on having
cellphone numbers available, the costs of sending mass text messages are extremely low.
Third, being sampled to receive a Bluespoon increased fertilizer coupon redemption
by 2 to 4 percentage points (columns 1 through 5). As described above, in the first season
the timing of the Bluespoon treatment was randomized, such it could have only possibly
impacted coupon redemption for group 1 and possibly group 2, and there could not have
been a causal effect on coupon redemption for group 3. This is what we find: Being
randomized to group 1 increased coupon redemption by as much as 10 percentage points,
while there is only a small, but insignificant effect for group 2, and no effect for group
3. Furthermore, we do not find any evidence for a persistent effect of the Bluespoon
intervention. Respondents who had received a Bluespoon in the previous season were
in fact somewhat less likely to redeem their coupon. This appears to be particularly the
case for individuals in Bluespoon group 1. One interpretation of this is that the Bluespoon
intervention encouraged respondents to experiment with fertilizer and the Bluespoon, but
they got disappointed by the results.
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2.3.2 Self-reported Fertilizer Use
Table 2.5 examines the impact of the different treatment conditions on self-reported fertilizer
use, based on survey answers in the short school endline and longer endline surveys at
respondents’ homes. Since some schools participated in two seasons of the program, we
stack observations in these regressions and control for the season, again clustering standard
errors by school. Results are presented in the season of the program (columns 1 and 2)
and the season after the program (columns 3 and 4). The table shows three sets of results.
First, we find evidence that the coupon increased overall fertilizer usage (columns 1 and 2).
However, the estimated effect varies substantially across types of survey, i.e. we estimate a
larger effect in the school survey (13 percentage points; statistically significant at the one-
percent level) compared to the home survey (6 percentage points; not statistically significant),
a discrepancy that may be due to social desirability bias. We also find suggestive evidence
of an effect in the season after the treatment (columns 3 and 4). Second, we find no impact
of the cooperative or text message treatments on fertilizer use. In contrast to the results on
coupon redemption, neither the school-level nor the individual-level text message treatment
affected self-reported fertilizer use. Given the effect of text messages on coupon redemption
at the individual level, the latter suggests that the text message reminders increased coupon
redemption among a subsample of individuals who would have used fertilizer already
anyway, rather than encouraging some individuals to use fertilizer who would not have
done so anyway. Third, similarly to the above results on coupon redemption, we find that
the Bluespoon treatment significantly increased fertilizer use, both in the same and in the
subsequent season of the program.
2.4 Bluespoon and Knowledge Diffusion
The section considers the impact of the different treatment conditions on the diffusion of
Bluespoons and knowledge across social networks.
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2.4.1 Group Membership
Table 2.6 shows the effect of the different treatment conditions (and in particular the
cooperative treatment) on group membership, as reported during the short endline surveys
(columns 1 and 2) and the long endline meetings (columns 3 through 5). Even though the
only assistance provided was coordination on forming a group and on organizing the first
meetings (as well as the provision of sodas at the first meeting), the cooperative treatment
had a strong impact on reported group membership overall (column 1), and on membership
of groups that discuss agriculture (column 2).
In the school endline survey, 49% of farmers in control schools report participating
in any group (cooperative, ROSCA, self-help group, or any other social group in which
members meet regularly). This percentage increases by 25 percentage points in cooperative
schools (column 1). The effect is slightly larger when examining cooperatives which discuss
agriculture: farmers in cooperative schools are 30 percentage points more likely to participate
in such a group, on a base of 33% in the control schools. These effects are attenuated but
still sizable in the home survey (columns 3 and 4). While the baseline means are similar
(at 59% and 39%, respectively) the estimated effect of the cooperative treatment is 11 to 13
percentage points (though still significant at the 1% level).6
2.4.2 Bluespoon Diffusion
Table 2.8 considers the diffusion of Bluespoons among original respondents, i.e. individuals
who attended the baseline school meetings. Diffusion was substantial even among indi-
viduals for whom we did not collect social network information and who, therefore, also
did not receive a Bluespoon: in control schools, 42% of these individuals had heard of the
Bluespoon (column 1), 24% owned at least one Bluespoon, and 28% were able to name its
correct price (Ksh 5). As expected, diffusion is near complete among individual who were
6A possible explanation for the lower estimates in home survey is timing: home surveys were conducted
approximately half a year after school surveys.
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selected for the Bluespoon treatment. The cooperative treatment increased the diffusion of
Bluespoons, as measured by the school endline surveys. Individuals in cooperative schools
were 5 percentage points more likely to have heard of the Bluespoon, and 7 percentage
points more likely to own a Bluespoon and to know the price of a Bluespoon. We also
find suggestive evidence of a treatment effect of the cooperative treatment on Bluespoon
diffusion in the longer home surveys, but the estimated coefficients are not statistically
significant.
Table 2.9 considers Bluespoon diffusion among friends of original respondents, based on
the home endline surveys. As expected, knowledge and ownership of Bluespoons is higher
among individuals whose friends were selected to receive a Bluespoon. In addition, among
individuals who were not friends of farmers who had received a Bluespoon, knowledge
and ownership were higher in cooperative, but not in coupon schools. Furthermore, being
a friend of a farmer who had received a Bluespoon appears to matter more in coupon
schools (column 1), but this is only the case for knowledge of Bluespoons (column 1), not
for ownership (column 2). Columns 3 through 9 of the table show essentially the same
information as the first two columns.
2.4.3 Knowledge Diffusion
Tables 2.7 and 2.10 consider knowledge diffusion among original respondents and friends,
respectively. The outcome variable of interest in these tables is respondents’ answers to
the question, “How much fertilizer they thought should be used per planting hole?" This
question was asked in two ways. First, we asked respondents to choose between five different
verbal options, one of which was ‘one half teaspoon’.7 Second, we showed respondents
four different containers with fertilizer, and asked them to choose the container which most
closely represented the quantity of fertilizer per planting hole which they thought was
7The remaining answers were ‘one quarter teaspoon’, ‘one teaspoon’, ‘one tablespoon’, and ‘don’t know’.
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appropriate. Again, one of the options included ‘one half teaspoon’.
The Bluespoon treatment significantly shifted respondents’ beliefs regarding how much
fertilizer to use (Table 2.10). In the verbal question, the fraction of individuals who chose
one-half teaspoon as the quantity of fertilizer to be used per planting hole increased by about
17 percentage points (on a base of 47 percent). While the intervention was targeted to CAN
knowledge and usage, we find similar results for DAP fertilizer (columns 7 through 12). We
find similar results using answers to the longer endline surveys with original respondents
(columns 1 through 6 of Table 2.10. In the verbal question and in a choice between four
spoons of different sizes, respondents are 23 to 25 percentage points more likely to choose
the option indicating one-half teaspoon. Columns 7 through 12 show the equivalent results
for agricultural contacts named by the original respondents during the baseline survey. We
only find limited evidence of an impact of the different conditions on beliefs regarding
optimal fertilizer use.
2.5 Conclusion
Insufficient knowledge of appropriate use may have been a key cause of low agricultural
technology adoption and productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, if farmers do
not observe each others’ inputs, diffusion of both information on the optimal input mix
and of the technology itself may be slow. This paper reports results from a large-scale
field experiment, which introduced a simple and salient tool, a blue measuring spoon, to
help farmers remember how much fertilizer to use. The main result of this paper is that
farmers who were randomly assigned to receive a spoon subsequently used more fertilizer,
a result that suggests that insufficient knowledge is a relevant barrier to fertilizer adoption.
Moreover, spoon purchases among the remaining farmers were higher when these were
more likely to use fertilizer due to a randomly assigned fertilizer discount program, and
when communication about agriculture was encouraged. Unlike fertilizer adoption itself,
purchase and use of measuring spoons diffused rapidly through social networks.
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Chapter 3
Trading Decisions as a Function of
Stock Return Quantiles: Implications
for the Disposition Effect1
3.1 Introduction
A long-standing puzzle in finance research is investors’ tendency to hold losing investments
too long and to sell winning investments too soon, a phenomenon that has been called
the “disposition effect" by Shefrin and Statman (1985). Using individual-level trading data,
Odean (1998) rules out various competing explanations. The disposition effect is persistent,
even when controlling for higher transaction costs of selling losers or tax incentives.2 Other
explanations, such as re-diversification or private information, similarly fail to capture
important features of the data.
Several theories have been proposed to explain the disposition effect. The most prominent
explanation invokes prospect theory, developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Odean
(1998) argues that with reference-dependent preferences, investors are risk-averse over gains
1Co-Authored with Tom Zimmermann
2Ivkovic et al. (2005) show that the disposition effect interferes with a "lock-in effect" for capital gains.
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and risk-seeking over losses, such that they sell winning stocks prematurely and gamble
on stocks that lost value in the past.3 Barberis and Xiong (2009) challenge this informal
argument by presenting a stylized asset pricing model involving investors with prospect
theory preferences.4 This model does not predict a disposition effect for many reasonable
parameter values, since loss aversion pushes investors to only purchase stocks with high
enough expected returns. In particular, if an investor is in the gain region, she will in
expectation be further away from the reference point than when she is in the loss region,
such that a disposition effect may not arise for mild curvature of the value function. In a
related paper, Barberis and Xiong (2012) introduce the concept of realization utility and
apply it to the disposition effect. In their model, investors derive utility from realizing gains
and losses, implying that an investor only sells a stock once the return exceeds a certain,
potentially investor-specific, threshold.
The main contribution of this paper is to contrast these competing explanations based
on their predictions for realizing different sizes of gains and losses. We use the Barber and
Odean (2000) data to establish two empirical facts. First, for all holding periods longer
than one month and for both gains and losses, the probability to sell a stock declines
monotonically with the size of the absolute return. That is, individual investors are not only
more likely to sell gains than to sell losses, but they are also more likely to sell stocks with
small absolute returns (i.e. stocks with prices close to the purchase price) than to sell stocks
with large absolute returns (for given holding periods). Second, the disposition effect is
more pronounced for relatively high returns, i.e. the difference in selling probability between
gains and losses of similar magnitude is more pronounced for large returns (i.e. comparing
large gains to large losses) than for small returns (i.e. comparing small gains to small losses).
Theories that attempt to explain the disposition effect also need to be consistent with these
3Odean (1998) notes that an irrational belief in mean reversion of stock returns could also explain the
disposition effect, but he is not able to separate the two hypotheses. He speculates that investors themselves
might not make a clear distinction: "For example, an investor who will not sell a stock for a loss might convince
himself that the stock is likely to bounce back rather than admit his unwillingness to accept a loss." Weber and
Camerer (1998) control for individuals’ beliefs in an experimental setting and find the disposition effect as well.
4Barberis and Xiong (2009) do not include probability weighting.
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additional facts. In particular, we argue that our first fact is not consistent with the model
of realization utility as proposed by Barberis and Xiong (2012), but it is consistent with a
version of prospect theory that we outline below.
Our empirical analysis employs two methodologies. First, in our preferred approach,
we follow Ivkovic et al. (2005) and construct portfolios of investors’ stock holdings for each
month. This method allows us to measure the survival time of stocks in investors’ portfolios,
conditional on the stock being in the gain or in the loss region. We extend this approach by
splitting up the sample into gain and loss quantiles, and then consider the selling patterns
across quantiles, controlling for stock holding periods, which generates the results described
above. Second, following the original estimation approach of Odean (1998), we construct an
investor’s portfolio for every day at which an investor made at least one trade. Replicating
Odean’s results, we compute the fraction of stocks valued at a gain (loss) that were actually
sold relative to all stocks that could have been sold at a gain (loss). Extending this approach
to stock returns of different magnitudes, we find that the disposition effect persists for all
return sizes, again controlling for the holding period. However, in contrast to the results
from our first approach, the selling probability increases with the size of the return for gains
and is constant in returns for losses.
We trace the apparent tension between results from the two approaches to different
conditioning sets of the estimates. The duration model of Ivkovic et al. (2005) computes
an unconditional probability of selling (for given holding periods), while the Odean (1998)
methology estimates a probability of selling a stock conditional on investor activity. To
reconcile the results from the two estimation approaches, we establish that an investor’s
propensity to make a trade is largest for small absolute portfolio returns, using several
parametric and non-parametric estimators.
Our paper is closely related to a recent contribution by Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012),
who investigate the relationship between past security returns and subsequent sales using
an approach similar to ours. Ben-David and Hirshleifer find that the probability to sell a
security is “asymmetrically V-shaped". That is, larger returns are more likely to be sold, this
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effect is more pronounced for positive returns compared to negative returns, and the selling
probability does not have a discontinuity at a stock return of 0. Since these results appear
to be in contrast to our findings, we seek to reconcile these findings with our results. We
document that the probability to sell is asymmetrically V-shaped only for short holding
periods. In particular, if results are pooled over different horizons, we do find a pronounced
discontinuity at 0 returns. We also find that the selling probability decreases in the absolute
value of the return, in line with our previous findings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 derives simple theoretical
predictions for prospect theory and realization utility. Section 3.3 describes the data and
our methodological approach. In Section 3.4 we present our main empirical results and
robustness checks, and in Section 3.5 we relate our results to Ben-David and Hirshleifer
(2012). Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Background
In this section, we provide a sketch of models of realization utility and of prospect theory
that have been suggested as explanations for the disposition effect. We are particularly
interested in the predictions of these models for the probability to sell a stock for different
returns, and we show that the models we consider generate quite different predictions in
this regard. This allows us to disentangle the explanations by comparing their predictions
to the actual probability to sell a stock for different returns.
3.2.1 Realization Utility
Barberis and Xiong (2012) argue that investors derive utility from realizing gains and losses
of assets that they own (as opposed to from consumption of the proceeds). The authors set
up a dynamic optimization problem and show that investors with realization utility will sell
a stock when the return exceeds some (positive) liquidation point. In other words, "if the
investor buys a stock, he voluntarily sells it only if its price rises a sufficient amount above
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the purchase price". In particular, an investor only sells at a loss if he is forced to do so by a
liquidity shock.
For illustrative purposes denote by P0 the investor’s purchase price and by Pt the price
in period t. Define gt := Pt/P0. An investor will then sell the stock if gt ≥ gi∗, where gi∗ ≥ 1
is the investor’s liquidation point which depends on individual and stock characteristics.5
Figure 3.1 shows the trading behavior of the individual investor depending on gt. The
probability to sell a stock below gt is drawn to be greater than zero to take liquidity shocks
into account. If gt exceeds the investor’s liquidation point, the stock is sold in t. While
realization utility predicts a step function for the individual’s probability to sell a stock, the
function is smoothed out when we consider the aggregated prediction. The liquidation point
depends on individual characteristics, for instance, on the time discount rate, transaction
cost, and the likelihood of a liquidity shock. If these factors vary across individuals, there
there will be heterogeneity of liquidation points across investors.
Figure 3.1: Realization utility prediction for individual trading
Figure 3.2 illustrates the implications for the aggregate probability that a stock is sold.
As investors do not realize losses, the probability to sell is constant in the loss region
5gi∗ is strictly greater than 1 if the investor faces some transaction cost.
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(liquidity shocks). When the return is slightly positive, some investors start selling the asset
because they have a relatively low liquidation point. A higher return implies that additional
liquidation points are exceeded. The exact shape of the function obviously depends on the
distribution of liquidation points among investors. Of course, there is no reason to expect
this relationship to be linear, but the probability to sell should be an increasing function of
the realized return.6
Figure 3.2: Implied trading pattern in the realization utility model
3.2.2 Prospect Theory
In their pioneering work, Shefrin and Statman (1985) and Odean (1998) linked prospect
theory to the disposition effect using informal arguments. In a formal analysis, however,
Barberis and Xiong (2009) find that a model including investors with prospect theory
preferences (without probability weighting) does not generate the disposition effect for
many combinations of parameter values.7 Prior arguments had neglected the effect of the
6For instance, a positively skewed distribution (many observations close to 1) would yield a concave
function.
7This has also been studied by Hens and Vlcek (2011).
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kink on the initial buying decision. Because of the kink, an investor will only buy a stock
in the first place if the initial expected return is high enough. This in turn implies that, in
the next period, the investor is relatively far away from the reference point when the stock
trades in the gain region, whereas she is closer to the reference point when the stock is in
the loss domain. When the value function has only mild curvature, the investor is almost
risk-neutral in the gain region when she is relatively far away from the reference point, and
she will therefore hold the stock after a gain. On the other hand, after a loss, she is still close
to the reference point and sells the stock for many parameter values of the value function.
Meng (2013) argues that a modified reference point can help to get around this result. Using
expectations as a reference point, she proposes a simple model in which prospect theory
generates a disposition effect for investors.
We present two views of prospect theory, both of which are able to generate the
disposition effect. First, we consider Barberis’ (2012) implementation of prospect theory in a
model of casino gambling. This model, very different from most other models in this area
of research, takes nonlinear probability weighting into account. It features some interesting
predictions that we think are transferable to a model of individual investment decisions.
Consider an asset that in every period with probability 0.5 either increases or decreases
by h. Figure 3.3 shows the possible prices after six periods. Barberis’ (2012) model implies
that even though this stock has an expected return of 0, a prospect theory agent might buy
it because she can give its return a favorably skewed distribution by overweighting small
probabilities and by choosing a suitable ex-ante exit strategy (e.g. sell the stock as soon
as you acquire losses). In stark contrast, Barberis and Xiong’s (2012) model implies that
prospect theory agents only buy stocks with high expected return. Barberis (2012) then
investigates implications for subsequent gambling behavior. He finds that naïve prospect
theory agents (that is, those who are not aware of their nonlinear probability weighting)
almost never exit after making losses and stop gambling too early after making gains; in
other words, they do not stick to their original plans. The actual exit pattern is illustrated by
the curved line in Figure 3.3. Intuitively, the pattern comes from a trade-off between the
94
nonlinear probability weighting (which pulls towards keeping on gambling, but less so if
the gain is already large) and the concavity of the utility function in the gain region.
Figure 3.3: Stock price for six periods and resulting exit behavior
Carrying this result over to the stock market, it implies that higher positive returns are
more likely to be realized. Figure 3.4 shows the trading pattern that can be derived from
the model. In particular, investors never realize losses under this specification, but are
increasingly willing to realize gains.
Figure 3.4: Implied trading pattern in the casino gambling model
A different, quite natural prediction arising from prospect theory focuses on the kink
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in the value function. As is well-known (see e.g. Barberis et al. (2006)), the kink induces
first-order risk aversion around the reference point (Figure 3.5 illustrates this). Even though
investors are risk-seeking in the loss domain, the kink induces them to reject a fair bet
involving small amounts if the price is close to the reference price.8 Being far away from the
reference return, on the other hand, implies only mild curvature of the utility function (i.e.
mild concavity/convexity) and, therefore, very similar behavior in these regions.
Figure 3.5: Local risk aversion in the value function
This gives rise to the prediction that the probability to sell will be higher around the
reference point, a phenomenon that we label bunching, and lower for larger gains and
larger losses. If, in addition, we assume that some degree of concavity/convexity away from
the reference point is preserved, we can also conclude that the probability to sell gains is
generally higher than the probability to sell losses (risk aversion vs. risk loving). This is
summarized in Figure 3.6. Note that the plot is qualitatively similar to Kaustia (2010) or
Meng (2013) who develop models along these lines.
8Note that a fundamental problem of this explanation is the question of why they would buy stocks in the
first place.
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Figure 3.6: Implied trading pattern in the bunching model
3.3 Data and Methodology
In this section, we describe the data that we use for our analysis. We then describe two
different approaches to estimation of the disposition effect that have been used in the related
literature. Section 3.3.2 discusses the duration model approach of Ivkovic et al. (2005) and
how it can be applied in our context. Section 3.3.3 describes the original approach of Odean
(1998). We apply both approaches and reconcile their results later in section 3.4.4.
3.3.1 Data
Terrance Odean kindly provided us with the dataset used in Barber and Odean (2000), which
is very similar to the one used in Odean (1998). This dataset from a large discount brokerage
house contains all trades as well as end-of-the-month positions for 158,034 US accounts
(belonging to 78,000 households) for the time period 1991-1996. Among other variables,
the data comprises household and account identifiers, dates, selling and purchase prices,
quantities and security identifiers.9 The data also feature some demographic information
that we use to control for investor characteristics in robustness checks of our analysis below.
9A detailed description of the data can be found in Barber and Odean (2000).
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Table 3.1 shows the the main demographic variables used in our analysis. Our data contain
relatively few female individuals, more than 50% of the individuals say they have some
knowledge about the stock market (self-reported), and 15% of the households are labeled as
frequent traders by the brokerage house (i.e. they trade more than 48 times per year).
Table 3.1: Demographic characteristics of investors
Variable Obs Mean Std Min Max
Married 37642 0.78 0.41 0 1
Female 47586 0.13 0.34 0 1
Age 41654 50.63 12.76 18 94
Home owner 54914 0.77 0.42 0 1
Knowledge 27179 0.56 0.5 0 1
Equity (’000s) 77981 53 277 -.97 51900
Frequent trader 77984 0.15 0.36 0 1
Taxable account 77984 0.63 0.48 0 1
We match the trades file with specific information for each account and trade (e.g.
account type, trading activity, product type). We get monthly and daily price data of
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securities from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Prior to our analysis, we
eliminate all trades other than trades of common stocks (e.g. foreign stocks), all trades that
involve short-selling and all trades including securities purchased before 1991. Also, we
drop all observations for which price data are not available and accounts that own only one
stock. This procedure closely follows Odean (1998). To get a sense of the data, and because
it is going to be important for our subsequent analysis, Figure 3.7 shows the histogram of
security holding durations in the sample. As one would expect, a lot of stocks are being
held for a short period of time, and the number of observations declines monotonically in
the holding duration.
Figure 3.7: Histogram of stock holding durations
3.3.2 Duration Model
Ivkovic et al. (2005) expand the same dataset that we use by including every month between
an initial purchase of a stock and the first sale of the stock (or the end of the observation
period, if the security had not been sold by then). For every month they match price data to
their dataset and determine whether the stock was sold/could have been sold for a gain
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or a loss by comparing the buying price to the daily price, just like in Odean (1998). For
a given duration they calculate the hazard rate for both gains and losses (i.e. the share of
gains/losses that are sold). The resulting figure plots the frequency of selling (and leaving
the sample) given that an investor has not sold the security yet, conditional on whether it is
a gain or a loss (relative to the buying price), an estimator that is commonly referred to as
the nonparametric Kaplan-Meier estimator of the hazard rate.10
We take this analysis further and, for every holding period, compute the hazard rate as
a function of return magnitude. For illustrative purposes, we show a graph with 3 quantiles
of returns for all holding periods (small, medium and large) below, but due to the large
sample we can focus on a much finer grid in our analysis when we keep the holding period
fixed.
As in Ivkovic et al. (2005), we then turn to the estimation of a Cox-proportional hazard
model of the form
λ(t, xi) = λ0(t)exp(x′iβ), (3.1)
where λ0(t) is the baseline hazard rate and xi contains individual-specific information which
will allow us to control for various stock-holder (and stock) characteristics, such as those
presented in Table 3.1.
3.3.3 Proportion of Realized Gains and Losses: The Odean Approach
To avoid spurious results in an upward-trending market, Odean (1998) does not simply
compare realized gains and losses. Instead, he constructs a more sophisticated measure. He
calculates portfolios for each account at each trading date by adding up trading records in
chronological order. Every time a sale takes place for a particular investor, he compares
10The estimate of the hazard rate is given by
λˆ(tk) =
sk
nk
where nk is the number of observations in the sample in period tk and sk is the number of observations that
leaves the sample in tk. Both numbers can be conditioned on gains and losses.
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the average buying price (i.e. the average price of a security for all purchases up to that
date) to the selling price for each stock in the investor’s portfolio at this point in time. An
observation counts as a realized gain if the selling price is higher than the average buying
price. It counts as a realized loss if the average buying price exceeds the selling price. The
observation is omitted if the prices are equal. Paper gains and paper losses are defined
similarly. Consider, for example, a security that is in an investor’s portfolio at the beginning
of the day, and is not sold. The observation counts as a paper gain if the average buying
price is lower than both the high and low price on that day. It is omitted if the average
buying price lies between the high and low price for the day. Paper losses are defined
equivalently. Odean (1998) then computes the proportion of realized gains of all gains
(PGR):
PGR =
# of realized gains
# of realized gains + # of paper gains
(3.2)
The proportion of realized losses (PLR) can be calculated in the same way. Odean then tests
for the presence of a disposition by testing whether PGR>PLR.
The original implementation of the approach suffers from a bias which comes from the
differential treatment of paper gains/losses relative to realized gains/losses. Note that paper
gains/losses are only counted when the average buying price is less than/exceeds both the
high and low price of that day. Otherwise they are not counted. Realized gains and losses,
on the other hand, are determined relative to the actual selling price regardless of whether
the average buying price lies within the daily high and low price of that stock. Since it is
more likely that small returns are between the daily high and low prices, this procedure
systematically overstates small realized gains/losses relative to small paper gains/losses.
Figure 3.8 illustrates this. The lower panel shows an observation that counts as a realized
gain although Pb ∈ [low, high], whereas the observation would not have been considered a
paper gain had it not been sold (upper panel).
This bias can, of course, be avoided by applying the same rule to both paper gains/losses
and realized gains/losses (that is, by dropping realized gains when their average buying
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Figure 3.8: Bias towards realized returns in the Odean approach
price falls in the interval between the low and high price of that day), a convention that we
follow throughout our analysis. While we think that our approach is more rigorous than
the original treatment of gains and losses in Odean (1998), we have confirmed that it does
not have a substantial effect on any of the results.
3.4 Results
Our main analysis consists of evaluating the Kaplan-Meier estimates for different returns
sizes, but given holding periods. Before we present these estimates in Section 3.4.2, we first
illustrate the main results using simple histograms. In Section 3.4.3, we present results using
the Odean (1998) methodology.
3.4.1 A First Look at the Data using Histograms
Figure 3.9 shows histograms of the returns for a holding period of 12 months. Panel
3.9a shows the histogram for all returns, whereas Panel 3.9b conditions on returns that
were realized.11 Comparison of the two histograms reveals that the conditional histogram
contains is much more concentrated around 0, i.e. there are relatively fewer observations
in the tails.12 This observation illustrates our main empirical result: on average, investors
are more likely to sell stocks with smaller absolute returns compared to stocks with larger
absolute returns (for given holding periods).
11We truncate the histograms at a return of 200%.
12Note the difference in scales between the two histograms.
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The corresponding kernel density estimates illustrate the same fact in a more compact
way (Figure 3.10). The dashed line in this figure represents the kernel density conditional on
selling, and the solid line corresponds to the unconditional kernel density function. As in
Figure 3.9, the probability mass is more concentrated around 0 conditional on selling, which
again implies that investors are more likely to sell stocks with smaller absolute returns.
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 use returns for a holding period of 12 months for illustration purposes,
but the describe patterns are robust and holds for shorter and longer holding periods as
well.
Figure 3.10: Kernel density estimates
3.4.2 Duration Model
We now turn to a more rigorous analysis of the patterns shown in the previous section using
Kaplan-Meier estimates. Figure 3.11 plots the estimated hazard rate as a function of the
holding period for both gains and losses for the entire sample for holding periods between
1 and 30 months. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively in line with Ivkovic et al.
(2005). In particular, the probability to sell a stock declines with the holding period, and the
104
probability to sell gains is greater than the probability to sell losses for all holding periods.
That is, we observe a disposition effect for all holding periods.
Figure 3.11: Conditional hazard rate for gains and losses
Figure 3.12 extends the analysis to the case of different return quantiles. We use quantiles
instead of return intervals for two reasons. First, since we are interested in comparing
differently-sized gains and losses, we want to make sure that the respective classes of returns
that we compare contain equal numbers of observations. Second, we cannot match very
high returns with same-sized low returns, because losses cannot exceed 100 percent.13 The
quantile procedure has proven valuable when trying to estimate non-linear functions and
has been used by others before (DellaVigna and Pollet (2009)).
The rich dataset enables us to split the data into many quantiles in the subsequent
analysis. For illustrative purposes, Figure 3.12 considers only 3 quantiles: small, medium,
and large gains and losses, respectively. Solid lines correspond to gains relative to purchase
price and dashed lines correspond to losses. Circles denote the smallest gains and losses,
triangles denote medium-sized ones and squares denote the largest tercile of gains and
losses, respectively. The disposition effect is apparent for all three quantiles of returns, i.e.
13If we restrict ourselves to gains smaller than 100% and use intervals instead of quantiles, we do get
qualitatively similar results.
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the probability to sell gains exceeds the probability to sell losses for each respective pair of
quantiles. Moreover, the probability to sell is lower for the larger gains and losses compared
to small gains and losses, respectively. While Figure 3.12 is suggestive, it is not conclusive.
The figure plots the probability to sell as a function of the holding period. However, we are
interested in the probability to sell a stock as a function of the return in order to compare
the empirical results to the theories that we considered in Section 3.2. Therefore, we repeat
the calculations behind Figure 3.12, split the sample into 25 gain and 25 loss quantiles and
plot the probability to sell as a function of those quantiles keeping the holding period fixed.
Figure 3.13 presents our main finding. It shows the hazard rate as a function of return
quantiles for four different holding periods: 1, 6, 12, and 24 months.14 The disposition effect
is apparent in all four panels: The probability to sell gains is larger than the probability
to sell losses throughout most holding periods and return magnitudes. Small returns
with short holding periods and large returns with long holding periods do not display a
disposition effect.15
More novel and remarkable, however, is the pattern of the selling probability as a
function of the return size. For both gains and losses, the probability of selling is largest
for small returns and steadily declines for higher (absolute) returns, a consistent pattern
throughout all panels. This finding stands in stark contrast to most model predictions that
we have derived in Section 3.2. The realization utility view and the casino gambling prospect
theory view imply an increasing probability to sell in the gain region. However, we find the
exact opposite pattern: smaller returns are more likely to be sold than larger returns. In
addition, the probability to sell in the loss region is not constant, which does not support
the realization utility view. On the other hand, the bunching view of prospect theory at the
end of Section 3.2 appears to be consistent with this evidence.
To further explore the relationship between the propensity to sell a stock and its return
14The findings are robust for other holding periods.
15Note that we have relatively few observations for holdings of exactly 24 months which makes the estimates
less precise.
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relative to the purchase price, we estimate a Cox-proportional hazard model. The parametric
approach has the advantage that we can control for other investor-specific characteristics.
Every investor-security combination is treated as an observation i, such that the hazard rate
is given by:
λi(t, x) = λ0(t)exp{x′itδ}, where (3.3)
x′itδ = gl,itβl + gm,itβm + gh,itβh + ll,itγl + lm,itγm + lh,itγh + demoi (3.4)
Here, gl,it is a dummy that is equal to 1 if individual-security combination i trades at a
low gain in holding period t. The other dummies are interpreted likewise with m being
medium gains and losses and h being large gains and losses. Finally, demoi denotes the
additional individual-level demographic control variables from Table 3.1 such as age, gender
and wealth.
For both gains and losses, we divide the stock returns into three groups each.16 Omitting
the intermediate middle group enables us to compare effects for small and large gains
respectively. For instance, β1 is the effect of a small gain on the probability to sell a security
that has not been sold yet (relative to a medium-size gain). Similarly, γ1 is the equivalent
effect for small losses (relative to a medium-size loss). Using this notation, the previous
findings can be rewritten in terms of the model’s coefficients: For instance, if the probability
of selling declines away from a 0 return, we should observe γ1 ≥ γ2 ≥ γ3 and β1 ≥ β2 ≥ β3.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3.2 report regression results with and without control
variables, respectively. As in the above figures, we find that the probability of selling
declines with the size of returns. Small gains are more likely to be sold than medium-sized
gains (the omitted category), and large gains are less likely to be sold than medium-sized
gains. The same holds true for small and large losses relative to medium-sized losses.
The coefficients between quantiles differ significantly, rejecting the hypothesis that the
probability of selling a security is constant across returns. The size of coefficients is in line
with the hypothesized order from the preceding paragraph. Adding demographic control
16We have tried other splits into 2 to 10 groups with no qualitative change in results or interpretation.
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Table 3.2: Cox-proportional hazard model for the probability to sell a
stock given its return relative to purchase price.
Dependent variable: Dummy for selling
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
gl 1.613∗∗∗ 1.630∗∗∗ 1.640∗∗∗ 1.628∗∗∗
gh -1.095∗∗∗ -1.107∗∗∗ -1.268∗∗∗ -1.297∗∗∗
ll 1.332∗∗∗ 1.345∗∗∗ 1.420∗∗∗ 1.415∗∗∗
lh -1.796∗∗∗ -1.816∗∗∗ -1.730∗∗∗ -1.722∗∗∗
Worst -0.110∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗
Best 0.045∗∗∗ 0.027
Controls X X
N 4,439,680 1,978,133 1,418,624 578739
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance
level, respectively.
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variables does not change results significantly.
Hartzmark (2015) shows that investors are more likely to sell stocks with more extreme
returns among the stocks in a portfolio. In columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.2, we therefore
add two dummies as additional control variables: “Best” is equal to 1 if a stock is the best
performing stock in an investor’s portfolio in a given month, and “Worst” is equal to 1 if
a stock is the worst performing stock in an investor’s portfolio in a given month. Adding
these controls does not alter our results. Given that the number of observations varies
widely across specifications, the stability of coefficients is remarkable.17
3.4.3 Odean Approach
Table 3.3 replicates Odean’s (1998) main result. We use the proposed correction of the bias
towards realized gains and losses, as discussed in Section 3.3.3. As a result, all estimates are
slightly lower than without bias correction, but qualitatively they are the same. We view
this as evidence that the disposition effect cannot be explained by this simple estimation
bias. For all months except for December, we find a disposition effect. PGR exceeds PLR
in magnitude and the difference is significantly different from zero.18 From January to
November, investors realize 12% of their gains but only 6.7% of their losses. In December,
the disposition effect is reversed and investors realize 9.9% of their gains but 10.5% of their
losses. As discussed in Odean (1998) and Ivkovic et al. (2005), investors face a trade-off
between realizing their losses and foregoing tax benefits. Since December is the last month
for realizing tax-loss savings, investors choose more often to sell their losers in that month.
Odean (1998) shows that the ratio of PGR and PLR declines over the year, implying that
17The sample size varies for two reasons: First, demographic control variables are only available for a
subset of regressors. Second, Hartzmark (2015) only includes observations that have at least five stocks in their
portfolio, and we follow this approach in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.2.
18The standard error is computed in the same way as in Odean (1998). That is, the standard error of the
respective difference is given by: √
PGR(1− PGR)
nrg + npg
+
PLR(1− PLR)
nrl + npl
where nrg, npg, nrl , npl are the numbers of realized gains, paper gains, realized losses and paper losses.
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tax motives become more important in the course of the year. Our estimates have higher
t-statistics than Odean (1998)’s results, mainly because our dataset is much larger.
Table 3.3: PGR and PLR for the Entire Data Set (bias corrected)
Variable Entire Year Dec Jan-Nov Entire Year (Odean)
PLR 0.070 0.105 0.067 0.098
PGR 0.118 0.099 0.120 0.148
Difference -0.048 0.007 -0.053 -0.05
t-stat -151.773 5.551 -160.598 -35
Figure 3.14 plots the proportions of realized gains and losses as functions of stock
returns for different return quantiles and four different holding periods.19 For all panels, the
proportion of realized gains exceeds the proportion of realized losses for all return quantiles.
That is, the disposition effect is apparent for all sizes of returns and for all holding periods.
Furthermore, for short holding periods, small gains are less likely to be sold than large
gains, while for larger holding periods, stocks with small and large returns are equally
likely to be sold.
At first sight, these results appear to be quite different from our previous findings.
However, compared to the Cox-proportional hazard model, the Odean approach is biased
towards trading activity. That is, the computed probability is not the unconditional proba-
bility to sell, but the conditional probability to sell, given some trading activity takes place
19For the same reasons as in the previous section, we use quantiles rather than return intervals.
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in the portfolio. In the next section, we show that the Odean graphs in Figure 3.14 display
the behavior that one would expect if small returns are (unconditionally) more likely to be
sold.
3.4.4 The Propensity to Trade
This section reconciles the seemingly contradictory findings from the two above empirical
approaches. The duration model computes a conditional probability of selling a stock, given
that it was not sold before. In contrast, the Odean approach estimates the probability to sell
given that any activity in the portfolio takes place. The difference in conditioning sets leads
to differences in results if the probability of an investor becoming active depends on the
return of her portfolio. A simple way to see this is using Bayes’ rule. If P(Sell) is the hazard
rate, then
P(Sell|active) =
=1︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(active|Sell) P(Sell)
P(active)
. (3.5)
The left-hand side represents the estimated object of the Odean approach, while the numer-
ator of the right-hand size shows represent the estimand of the Cox-proportional hazard
model. Therefore, if P(active) varies with the size of the return, then we should expect
differences in results from the two approaches.
We estimate P(active) using parametric probit regressions as well as a nonparametric
approach. To start, we construct stock portfolios for each investor at the investor-month
level as in Section 3.3.2. We then collapse the data, compute the portfolio return for each
investor-month combination and construct a dummy that is equal to one if the investor
traded at all (sold or bought any stock) in a particular month and that is zero otherwise. Our
resulting dataset therefore has one observation for each investor and each month.20 We then
regress this dummy on the portfolio return to get an estimate of the propensity of trading
as a function of the portfolio return. Since the shape of this relationship is unknown, we
20We require that an investor holds at least two stocks in a given month to be included in the sample.
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start with a nonparametric regression using the Nadaraya-Watson estimator, as described in
Haerdle (1990).
The nonparametric model that we want to estimate is given by:
g(x) = E[y|X = x], (3.6)
where x denotes the portfolio return, and y is our activity dummy. Therefore, an estimate of
g(x) can be obtained from the regression
y = g(x) + e, e ∼ (0, σ2(x)) (3.7)
Figure 3.15 shows the estimated regression function and 95% confidence bands. The
propensity to trade is highest around 0 returns (with the peak slightly above 0), and declines
in absolute size of returns. This is exactly what one would expect given the estimates of the
two above approaches.
Table 3.4 confirms this result parametrically. We regress the portfolio activity dummy
on a (first and third order) polynomial of the portfolio return, allowing for a structural
break in the relationship at a portfolio return of 0. The first two columns show results for a
linear regression while the last two show results for a probit model. All models confirm the
significant impact of the portfolio return on the propensity to trade at all, and the regression
function is in line with the non-parametric model above, that is, it is upward-sloping for
negative returns and downward-sloping for positive returns.
To summarize, the results of the duration model and the Odean approach can be
reconciled by taking into account that the conditioning sets of the two estimates differ. The
link is given by the probability that an investor makes any trade as a function of the return
of her portfolio. This probability declines with the size of absolute returns, which reconciles
our seemingly different results from Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3.
3.5 Relation to Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012)
Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012) also investigate the relation between past security returns
115
Figure 3.15: Nonparametric estimate of propensity to trade. Grey area denotes the 95% confidence bands.
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Table 3.4: Propensity to trade as a function of portfolio return
Dependent variable: Dummy for any trade
Regressors Linear model Probit model
I(Retp > 0) 0.005∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
Retp 0.222∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗ 1.753∗∗∗ 2.600∗∗∗
I(Retp > 0)Retp -0.452∗∗∗ -1.051∗∗∗ -3.497∗∗∗ -5.106∗∗∗
Ret2p 1.026∗∗∗ 3.463∗∗∗
Ret3p 0.887∗∗∗ 3.447∗∗∗
I(Retp > 0)Ret2p -0.062 -2.261∗∗
I(Retp > 0)Ret3p -1.468∗∗∗ -1.553
Constant 0.115∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ -1.158∗∗∗ -1.119∗∗∗
N 1254918 1254918 1254918 1254918
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level,
respectively.
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and subsequent sales using the same data that we used. The main result of this paper is
that the probability to sell a security is “asymmetrically V-shaped”. That is, larger returns
are more likely to get sold and more so for positive returns, and the selling probability
does not have a discontinuity at a stock return of 0. While the latter is consistent with our
results (recall that we find a stronger disposition effect for larger returns), the former fact
seemingly stands in contrast to our results. In this section, we investigate the causes of this
discrepancy.
In contrast to the approach in Ivkovic et al. (2005), Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012)
follow the holding of a stock on each day after it was purchased without conditioning on
portfolio activity as in Odean (1998). This approach hugely expands the data set and most
of our results are based on a random sample of 25% of accounts.21 For the short holding
horizons in Figure 3.16 below, we are able to use the entire data set.
We start by replicating the main results in Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012). First, we
follow their procedure to construct each investor’s portfolio on each possible trading day.
This enables us to follow each stock from the purchase day to the selling day. Table 3.5
reports the unconditional probability that a stock gets sold for different holding periods. In
general, stocks are sold infrequently: The probability that a stock is sold within the first 30
(trading) days after purchase is 0.79 percent. The monthly selling probability monotonically
decreases for longer holding horizons.
Table 3.5: Unconditional probability (in %) of selling for different numbers of holding days. Note: Days are
trading days.
Holding days 1-30 31-60 61-90 91-120 121-150 151-180 181-210 211-240
Probability to sell .790 .508 .391 .309 .258 .230 .201 .174
21Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012) follow the same strategy and base their estimates on a random sample of
10,000/77,000 ≈ 12% of accounts.
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Figure 3.16 shows our replication of Ben-David and Hirshleifer’s (2012) motivating
results (Figure 1 of their paper). We document a sharp decrease of the selling probability
around small stock returns, and we find that the difference between small positive and
small negative returns is negligible.22 These results support an asymmetrically V-shaped
selling schedule. That is, stocks with small returns are unlikely to be sold and stocks with
higher returns are more likely to be sold, and more so for positive returns. However, the
results in Figure 3.16 are conditional on the specific holding periods of 1 or 5 days, both of
which are extremely short.
Figure 3.17 illustrates the results of the same exercise when data are pooled over different
holding horizons. The left panel pools all holding periods less than 30 days and is generally
in line with the results in Figure 3.16, although there is an apparent small discontinuity
around 0. The right panel pools all holding periods of less than 250 trading days and looks
very different: The discontinuity of the selling probability around 0 is more apparent and
the probability to sell appears to decrease with the absolute value of the return.
Table 3.6 provides a more detailed account of the relation between the discontinuity
result around a return of 0 and the holding period. We regress an indicator for stock sales
(multiplied by 100) on an indicator of whether a stock’s return was greater than zero, on
a third-order polynomial of a stock’s return and on interactions of the indicator and the
polynomial terms. Each column reports the regression results for a different stock holding
period. For ease of interpretability, we report results for the linear probability model here,
but none of the results change when a logistic regression model is used instead. The
indicator for a positive return is statistically significant in each regression. For instance, for
a holding period of up to 30 days, a positive return increases the likelihood to sell the stock
by .367 percentage points. To assess whether this is large or small, we scale the coefficient
by the unconditional probability of selling for each holding interval (from Table 3.5 above)
22Our replication is based on a quadratic polynomial in the stock return on each side of the threshold of 0,
while Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012) use higher-order polynomials. We produced additional results using
nonparametric kernel density regressions (available on request) that looked even more similar to the original
results.
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in the last row of the table. For shorter holding horizons, the discontinuity is about 40% of
the unconditional probability to sell, while for longer holding horizons it is about 20%.
The effect of positive returns relative to purchase price on the probability to sell a stock is
sizeable for all horizons within one year of stock purchase. The long-lasting effect is in line
with other research that investigates how investment decisions depend on past prices. For
instance, Heath et al. (1999) show that employees are more likely to exercise stock options
when the stock price is greater than the maximum achieved over the previous year, and
Baker et al. (2012) show that the 52-week high is an important anchor for merger offers.
Here, we show that the purchase price of a stock affects trading decisions for (at least) one
year, an unsurprising finding in light of the aforementioned studies.
To summarize, we document that the probability to sell is asymmetrically V-shaped
only for very short holding periods. If results are pooled over different horizons, we find a
pronounced discontinuity at 0 returns and we also find that the selling probability decreases
in the absolute value of the return, in line with our previous findings.
It seems plausible that investors trading at very short horizons are different from those
that trading at longer horizons. Indeed, Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012) report weaker
results for infrequent traders (their Figure 5). As our study generally focuses on holding
periods greater than one month (and up to two years), it can also be read as a study of the
behavior of those less frequent traders.
3.6 Conclusion
What drives the disposition effect? In this paper, we consider two leading explanations,
prospect theory and realization utility. We derive implications of the theories for the
probability to sell as a function of the return size, and contrast the predictions to new
empirical findings of this relationship. Our main empirical finding is that, for all but very
short holding horizons, investors are more likely to sell stocks with small returns (i.e. stocks
with prices close to the purchase price) than to sell stocks with large returns. We use two
different empirical approaches. Using the duration model of Ivkovic et al. (2005), we find
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that larger absolute returns are less likely to be sold than small returns. Using the Odean
(1998) methodology, we find that small gains are less likely to be sold than large gains for
small holding periods, while there is no relationship between the return size and selling
probability for larger holding periods. Realization utility cannot explain important features
of the data. In contrast, a version of prospect theory, that puts emphasis on “bunching"
around the kink appears to be consistent with the facts.
We then reconcile these seemingly contradictory empirical findings by pointing out that
the two approaches estimate different probabilities. While Ivkovic et al. (2005) consider
the probability of selling a stock with a given return in a given month (conditional on still
holding it), Odean considers the probability of selling a stock, given that the investor sells
or buys a stock in her portfolio. Therefore, a comparison of the two approaches needs to
take into account that the probability of undertaking any transaction in the portfolio is a
function of the individual returns of the stocks in the portfolio. We find that individuals
are more likely to engage in transactions for stocks with small returns than for stocks with
large returns. Jointly, these findings pose yet another challenge: An investor is more likely
to perform any action (i.e. sell or buy stocks, look into her portfolio) if returns of stocks in
her portfolio are small. Once the investor decides to act, however, she is more likely to sell
large returns. It is hard to think of a theory that would predict this.
Of course, consistency with the facts alone does not make a theory the true explanation.
For instance, an explanation that combines elements of prospect theory, realization utility,
and overconfidence might very well be at the heart of the disposition effect. Moreover,
despite the fact that the choice of the reference point is crucial for any analysis of reference-
dependent utility, with the exception of Meng (2013), the existing literature on the disposition
effect has not thoroughly investigated this choice. Instead, it solely focuses on a stock’s
buying price as "a noisy proxy for the investor’s true reference point" (Odean, 1998).23
23While Odean discusses the possibility of other determinants of the reference point (in particular, expecta-
tions), his focus remains on variants of the purchase price. For investors who buy the same stock several times,
Odean considers the average purchase price, the highest purchase price, the first purchase price, and the most
recent purchase price
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Koszegi and Rabin (2006) argue that expectations, rather than the status quo, play a key role
in the formation of individuals’ reference points. In particular, when individuals do not
plausibly expect to maintain the status quo, “equating the reference point with expectations
generally makes better predictions." This suggests that the purchase price might not be
a good choice of a reference point for trading decisions. While it may be a good proxy
in times of low returns, with soaring stock prices like in the 1990s – our dataset covers
transaction from 1991 through 1996, a time period during which on average the S&P 500
index rose over 15% annually – investors may have higher expectations, and, hence, a higher
reference point than the status quo. Future research should take into account the possibility
that investors’ reference points may be driven by expectations or might generally deviate
from a stock’s purchase price.
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Figure 5.5: Reported Sum of Total Savings by Incentive Treatment Group at Baseline
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Figure 5.6: Interaction between Sobriety Incentives (not pooled) and Savings Treatments
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Table 5.1: Balance Table for Main Demographs
Treatment groups p value for test of:
Control Incentives Choice 1=2 1=3 1 = (2∪ 3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 36.54 35.27 35.08 0.43 0.29 0.30
( 9.96 ) ( 9.92 ) ( 7.40 )
Married 0.82 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.92 0.84
( 0.39 ) ( 0.40 ) ( 0.39 )
Number of children 1.80 1.77 1.80 0.93 0.98 0.97
( 1.19 ) ( 1.55 ) ( 1.19 )
Lives with wife in Chennai 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.82 0.98 0.88
( 0.44 ) ( 0.45 ) ( 0.45 )
Wife earned income during past month 0.24 0.17 0.28 0.27 0.58 0.80
( 0.43 ) ( 0.38 ) ( 0.45 )
Years of education 4.89 5.45 5.49 0.38 0.34 0.28
( 3.93 ) ( 3.95 ) ( 3.92 )
Able to read the newspaper 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.93 1.00 0.96
( 0.49 ) ( 0.49 ) ( 0.49 )
Added 7 plus 9 correctly 0.86 0.77 0.77 0.20 0.19 0.12
( 0.35 ) ( 0.42 ) ( 0.42 )
Multiplied 5 times 7 correctly 0.48 0.41 0.47 0.36 0.85 0.53
( 0.50 ) ( 0.50 ) ( 0.50 )
Distance of home from office (km) 2.64 2.30 2.65 0.20 0.99 0.54
( 2.15 ) ( 1.06 ) ( 1.72 )
Years lived in Chennai 31.57 27.77 29.16 0.04?? 0.17 0.05?
( 12.19 ) ( 11.10 ) ( 9.81 )
Reports having ration card 0.65 0.52 0.61 0.11 0.63 0.22
( 0.48 ) ( 0.50 ) ( 0.49 )
Has electricity 0.81 0.68 0.75 0.07? 0.37 0.10
( 0.40 ) ( 0.47 ) ( 0.44 )
Owns TV 0.76 0.59 0.68 0.03?? 0.27 0.05??
( 0.43 ) ( 0.50 ) ( 0.47 )
Happiness ladder score (0 to 10) 5.73 5.46 5.76 0.43 0.94 0.68
( 2.14 ) ( 2.08 ) ( 2.11 )
Notes: This table shows balance checks for main demographics across the incentive treatment groups.
Columns 1 through 3 show sample means for individuals in the Control Group (1), Incentive Group (2),
and the Choice Group (3), respectively. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Columns 4 through 6
show p-values of OLS regressions of each variable on dummies for each treatment group. Columns 4 and
5 shows p-values of tests for equality of means between the Incentive and Choice Groups compared to
the Control Group, respectively. Column 6 shows the corresponding p-values for comparisons between
the Control Group and the Incentive and Choice Groups combined.
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Table 5.2: Balance Table for Work and Savings
Treatment groups p value for test of:
Control Incentives Choice 1=2 1=3 1 = (2∪ 3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years worked as a rickshaw puller 14.06 12.49 12.81 0.29 0.34 0.25
( 9.53 ) ( 8.78 ) ( 6.73 )
# of days worked last week 5.41 5.18 5.43 0.36 0.94 0.60
( 1.35 ) ( 1.65 ) ( 1.39 )
Has regular employment arrangement 0.47 0.52 0.47 0.53 0.97 0.74
( 0.50 ) ( 0.50 ) ( 0.50 )
Owns rickshaw 0.17 0.25 0.28 0.20 0.10? 0.08?
( 0.38 ) ( 0.44 ) ( 0.45 )
Says ’no money’ reason for not owning rickshaw 0.61 0.65 0.59 0.67 0.72 0.98
( 0.49 ) ( 0.48 ) ( 0.50 )
Reported labor income in Phase 1 (Rs/day) 291.86 301.08 273.94 0.69 0.39 0.79
( 119.97 ) ( 160.54 ) ( 138.33 )
Total savings (Rs) 13261 23903 38184 0.22 0.13 0.07?
( 31197 ) ( 67739 ) ( 139224 )
Total borrowings (Rs) 11711 5648 7913 0.11 0.36 0.18
( 29606 ) ( 15762 ) ( 22253 )
Savings at study office in Phase 1 (Rs/day) 40.98 44.67 41.04 0.62 0.99 0.77
( 41.93 ) ( 49.28 ) ( 48.25 )
Notes: This table shows balance checks for work- and savings-related variables across the incentive treatment groups.
Columns 1 through 3 show sample means for individuals in the Control Group (1), Incentive Group (2), and the
Choice Group (3), respectively. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Columns 4 through 6 show p-values of OLS
regressions of each variable on dummies for each treatment group. Columns 4 and 5 shows p-values of tests for
equality of means between the Incentive and Choice Groups compared to the Control Group, respectively. Column 6
shows the corresponding p-values for comparisons between the Control Group and the Incentive and Choice Groups
combined.
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Table 5.3: Balance Table for Alcohol Consumption
Treatment groups p value for test of:
Control Incentives Choice 1=2 1=3 1 = (2∪ 3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years drinking alcohol 12.89 11.68 12.86 0.42 0.99 0.65
( 10.02 ) ( 8.42 ) ( 9.03 )
Number of drinking days per week 6.72 6.83 6.68 0.39 0.70 0.77
( 0.80 ) ( 0.76 ) ( 0.60 )
Drinks usually hard liquor (≥ 40 % alcohol) 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.32 0.94 0.71
( 0.11 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.12 )
Alcohol expenditures in Phase 1 (Rs/day) 91.95 87.09 81.92 0.39 0.07? 0.12
( 37.03 ) ( 32.48 ) ( 32.98 )
# of standard drinks per day in Phase 1 6.17 5.71 5.80 0.21 0.31 0.19
( 2.29 ) ( 2.17 ) ( 2.18 )
# of std drinks during day in Phase 1 2.13 2.45 2.40 0.38 0.42 0.31
( 2.01 ) ( 2.48 ) ( 2.10 )
Baseline fraction sober 0.49 0.45 0.43 0.48 0.30 0.30
( 0.40 ) ( 0.43 ) ( 0.41 )
Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test score 14.61 13.94 14.69 0.44 0.92 0.67
( 4.32 ) ( 6.16 ) ( 4.98 )
Drinks usually alone 0.87 0.82 0.85 0.40 0.80 0.51
( 0.34 ) ( 0.39 ) ( 0.36 )
Reports life would be better if liquor stores closed 0.84 0.80 0.77 0.52 0.27 0.29
( 0.37 ) ( 0.40 ) ( 0.42 )
In favor of prohibition 0.81 0.77 0.84 0.62 0.59 0.99
( 0.40 ) ( 0.42 ) ( 0.37 )
Would increase liquor prices 0.07 0.14 0.12 0.18 0.32 0.15
( 0.26 ) ( 0.35 ) ( 0.33 )
Notes: This table shows balance checks for alcohol-related variables across the incentive treatment groups. Columns
1 through 3 show sample means for individuals in the Control Group (1), Incentive Group (2), and the Choice
Group (3), respectively. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Columns 4 through 6 show p-values of OLS
regressions of each variable on dummies for each treatment group. Columns 4 and 5 shows p-values of tests for
equality of means between the Incentive and Choice Groups compared to the Control Group, respectively. Column
6 shows the corresponding p-values for comparisons between the Control Group and the Incentive and Choice
Groups combined.
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Table 5.6: Attrition and Inconsistencies of Choices
Choice Group Incentive Group Control Group
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 3 Week 3
Present & consistent (%) 88.0 89.3 88.0 90.1 86.7
Absent (%) 5.3 6.7 6.7 5.6 6.0
Inconsistent (%) 6.7 4.0 5.3 4.2 7.2
Notes: This table shows the fraction of individuals who were present and made consistent choices by treatment
group and week of study. During a given choice session, an individual chose inconsistently if he chose Option
B for the unconditional amount Y1, but Option A for the unconditional amount Y2 with Y2 > Y1. For instance,
his choices are inconsistent if he preferred Option B in Choice 1, but not in Choice 3.
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Table 5.7: Summary of Choices in Choice Group Over Time
Option A Option B Percent choosing A
Choice BAC > 0 BAC = 0 regardless of BAC Week 1 Week 2 Week 3
(1) Rs. 60 Rs. 120 Rs. 90 60.0 62.7 57.3
(2) Rs. 60 Rs. 120 Rs. 120 46.7 52.0 44.0
(3) Rs. 60 Rs. 120 Rs. 150 30.7 33.3 40.0
Notes: This table shows the fraction of individuals among the Choice Group who preferred
incentives over unconditional amounts for each of the choices by week of study. Individuals who
were either absent or did not choose consistently are counted as not preferring incentives.
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5.2 More Detailed Model Solution
5.2.1 Solution for the Case of Isoelastic Utility
This section provides the solution of the model described in section 5.1 for the commonly
used case of isolelastic utility.
No commitment savings. Equations (1.7) and (1.9) become
c−γ2 = β(1+ M)c
−γ
3 (5.1)
c−γ1 =
[
β
dc2
dY2
+
(
1− dc2
dY2
)]
c−γ2 (5.2)
Using (1.8) and (5.1), we can solve for c3 and c2 as functions of Y2:
c3 =
(
1+ M
1+ θ
)
Y2 and c2 =
(
θ
1+ θ
)
Y2. (5.3)
where θ ≡ (β(1+ M))−1γ (1+ M). This implies dc2Y2 = θ1+θ and, using (5.2), we get
c1 =
(
1+ βθ
1+ θ
)−1
γ
c2. (5.4)
Using the budget constraint and rewriting (5.1) to c2 = θ1+M c3, this yields
cNC3 =
Y(1+ M)
1+ θ + θ
[
1+βθ
1+θ
]−1
γ
. (5.5)
Commitment savings. Equations (1.10) and (1.11) become
c2 = (1+ M)
−1
γ c3, (5.6)
c1 = β
−1
γ c2 =
(
θ
1+ M
)
c3. (5.7)
Using the budget constraint (1.12), this implies
cC3 =
Y(1+ M)
1+ θ + (1+ M)1−
1
γ
. (5.8)
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5.2.2 A Special Case: Log Utility
This section considers a special case of log utility (γ = 1), i.e. u(ct) = log(ct).
No commitment savings. Equations (1.7) and (1.9) become
c3 = β(1+ M)c2 (5.9)
c2 =
[
β
dc2
dY2
+
(
1− dc2
dY2
)]
c1 (5.10)
Using c3 = (Y2 − c2)(1+ M), we use (5.9) to solve for c3 and c2 as functions of Y2:
c2 =
1
1+ β
Y2 and c3 =
β(1+ M)
1+ β
Y2 (5.11)
This implies dc2dY2 =
1
1+β and, hence c2 =
2β
1+β c1 and c3 = (1+ M)
2β2
1+β c1. Hence, we get
c1 = Y− c2 − c31+ M = Y−
2β
1+ β
c1 − 2β
2
1+ β
c1 =
Y
1+ 2β1+β +
2β2
1+β
(5.12)
This implies cNC3 =
2β2
1+3β+2β2 Y(1+ M).
Commitment savings. Consider now the solution for the commitment savings case. Equa-
tions (1.10) and (1.11) become
c2 = βc1 c3 = (1+ M)c2 (5.13)
Using the budget constraint (1.12), this yields
cC3 = (Y− c1 − c2) (1+ M) (5.14)
= Y(1+ M)− c3
β
− c3 (5.15)
=
β
1+ 2β
Y(1+ M) (5.16)
Comparing the two solutions yields
∆ ≡ cC3 − cNC3 =
[
β(1− β)
(1+ 2β)(1+ β)
]
Y(1+ M) (5.17)
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Taking the derivative of the expression in brackets with respect to β yields
∂[·]
∂β
=
1− 2β− 5β2
(1+ 3β+ 2β2)2
(5.18)
This expression is positive for 0 ≤ β ≈ 0.29 and negative for 0.29 ≈ β ≤ 1.
153
